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The labour market in Italy is characterised by the following
structurally specific features:
1) Regional differentials. In 1996 the unemployment rate was be-
tween 7% and 10% in Central and Northern regions, while it
was over 21% in the South where, moreover, the participation
rate was also low, especially for women (37% in the North and
Centre, 28% in the South);
2) Unemployment is highest for young people. In 1996 the unem-
ployment rate of the 15-29 year old labour force (25.8%), in It-
aly, was more than double that of the total working age popula-
tion and the youth problem is much greater in the South where
the unemployment rate of 15-29 year olds rises to 45.3%;
3) The low rate of employment is mainly due to the lower female
rate of employment (36.2%) that is far inferior than the EU av-
erage rate of employment (49.7%).
Why is the youth unemployment rate so high?
Aside from demographic trends (namely the coming of age of
the numerically largest generations, born at the beginning of the
1960s - i.e. the so called “baby boom” generation), and from de-
creasing labour demand, the other variables explaining the domi-
nant features of Italian unemployment are institutional factors
(such as the role of family) as well as qualitative labour mis-
matches. Indeed, the new entrants into the labour market are
more highly educated but the occupational mix has not evolved in
a similar way. Technological progress seems, on the contrary, to
be bringing about a polarisation of the skill mix.6
The main labour policy undertakings in recent years have been
developed in three areas:
*  increasing labour market flexibility through the introduction of
new rules for atypical employment and hiring procedures;
*  granting general reductions in payroll taxes, as well as cuts in
wage costs and social insurance contributions differentiated ac-
cording to regions and economic sectors;
*  fostering integration or reintegration of disadvantaged groups
(women, young people, workers on short-time compensation
and on mobility rolls, etc.) into work.
These policies, however, have not produced the expected re-
sults, especially the second set of policies which have merely
brought about an increase in budgetary constraints in exchange
for only modest increases in employment.
A large part of public spending (over 50%) has been dedicated
to social security and the welfare system and has caused many
problems for the Italian economy and to the labour market in par-
ticular. In fact, in addition to the imbalance between the cost and
quality of services, there has also been the high cost of the pen-
sion system. Notably, although the pension system, with easy
transfers in crisis areas, has caused an increase in commodity
demand and in welfare, it has also contributed to strengthening
the role of the family in the guarantee system. Accordingly, espe-
cially for first-job seekers in the South, a higher reservation wage
and growing long term unemployment is to be expected with the
consequent destruction of human capital
1.
During the ‘90s government, business and labour institutions all
came to realise that fighting unemployment would require a co-
ordinated set of policy measures based on the following main ob-
jectives:
1. increasing employment, especially in southern Italy, through
selective investments, mainly in infrastructure and in new l a-
bour intensive sectors;
2. investing in human resources, training and education;
                                                
1. Even this, as recent research has shown, demonstrates that transfers from
the family to young people in Italy is lesser than that of other countries, like
the United States, where the youth unemployment rate is lower (12,5%).7
3. ensuring the effective running of the labour market, by encour-
aging flexibility (part-time and rented work contracts);
4. offering a range of services to workers and business: informa-
tion, vocational guidance, training, etc.;
5. guaranteeing, with special terms, financial protection to active
job seekers.
In the following paper we will provide a policy review concen-
trating on specific topics of the youth unemployment problem. The
paper consists of two parts: the first provides an overview of the
Italian labour market, with international comparisons, and an
analysis of North-South dualism and of issues concerning the
problems of youth unemployment. The second part describes and
evaluates the labour policies introduced in the last ten years and in
the new National Labour Agreement (Accordo per il Lavoro).89
PART A: YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IN ITALY1011
1.  The labour market in Italy
GDP growth in Italy was on average 3.2% per annum from
1960 to 1993 (1,3 points more than the USA and 0.7 more than
OECD-Europe). In particular, during the last ten years, sluggish
growth or stagnation gave rise to a serious crisis between 1990
and 1993 (Graph. 1), partially offset in 1994-1995 and restored in
1996-1997.
GRAPH. 1 - AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF REAL PER CAPITA GDP
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However, even if the Italian GDP growth rate is on average
higher than that of OECD-Europe and the USA, unfortunately
these production improvements have not been to the benefit of the
labour market. The Italian labour market shows marked anomalies12
compared with the other major European industrialised countries.
At aggregated levels the anomalies exist mainly in:
a) a lower employment rate;
b) a lower participation rate;
c) the fact that the gap between the other European countries in
terms of the unemployment rate has been reduced.
The employment rate
Since the sixties the trend of the Italian employment rate is
constantly below the European average and that of the USA
(Graph. 2).
GRAPH. 2 - THE EMPLOYMENT RATE (1960-1993)

















































































Source: based on OECD data.13
In 1995 the Italian employment rate (as a percentage of the
population aged 15-64) (Graph. 3) is particularly low (52,1%), sec-
ond only to that of Spain (46%), and 8 points lower than the Euro-
pean average (60,2%).
GRAPH. 3 - THE EMPLOYMENT RATE - 1995




















Source: based on OECD data.
These differences are mainly affected by the level of the female
employment rate (Graph. 4) 36.2% in 1994 and significantly infe-
rior to the European average (49.7%). On the other hand, the Ital-
ian male employment rate, 68.6%, is in line with that of the other
European countries; higher than that of France and Spain, but
lower than the European average.14
GRAPH. 4 - THE EMPLOYMENT RATE BY GENDER - 1995









































Source: based on OECD data.15
Nevertheless, in the last twenty years employment has been
modifying gradually, with an increased share of women related to
the increase of those employed in the service sector. Indeed, dur-
ing the ‘60s the presence of women in the labour market was
sharply curtailed by the decline in the primary sector, whereas, in
subsequent decades, this trend was more than offset by the
growth in the service sector.
The process of the “feminisation” of the labour market can be
seen in Graph. 5. In fact, from 1966 to 1995 the pattern of female
employment by age in Italy has moved significantly closer to that
of male employment even if the level remains lower.




Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data.17
One reason could be the insufficient growth of the service sec-
tor. In 1995 the Italian and European employment rates (52.1%
and 60.1%) were lower than in the USA (73.5%) and this is due
primarily to low female employment (the female employment rate
is 66,3% in the USA, 48,2% in the EU and 36,4% in Italy) (Graphs
3 and 4). The reason for this difference is the considerable
“tertiarization” in the USA. In the ‘60s, ‘70s and ‘80s the service
sector in Italy expanded steadly, reaching a share of almost 60%
of total employment, but not enough to match that of the USA
(73.0%) (Tab. 1).
TAB. 1 - THE EMPLOYMENT RATE BY SECTOR
(PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES) - 1983, 1993, 1994, 1995. % ON POP. 15-64
AGRICOLTURE INDUSTRY SERVICES
1983 1993 1994 1995 1983 1993 1994 1995 1983 1993 1994 1995
Italy 12,0 7,5 7,0 - 36,0 33,0 33,0 - 51,0 59,6 60,0 -
Germany 5,0 4,0 3,0 3,0 41,0 39,0 38,0 38,0 54,0 58,0 59,0 59,0
France 8,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 34,0 28,0 27,0 27,0 58,0 67,0 68,0 69,0
UK 3,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 33,0 26,0 26,0 26,0 64,0 72,0 72,0 72,0
Spain 19,0 10,0 10,0 9,0 33,0 31,0 30,0 30,0 48,0 59,0 60,0 61,0
USA 4,0 2,7 3,0 3,0 28,0 24,1 24,0 24,0 68,0 73,2 73,0 76,0
CEE 9,0 6,0 5,0 - 35,0 32,0 31,0 - 56,0 63,0 64,0 -
OECD-EU 13,0 9,7 10,0 - 33,0 28,2 29,0 - 53,0 58,2 61,0 -
OECD-TOT 9,0 8,0 8,0 - 32,0 27,0 28,0 - 59,0 65,0 64,0 -
Source: OECD.
Moreover, if we look at the total employment in Italy in recent
times (Graph. 6) the job crisis was extremely serious. From April
1992 to January 1995, the Bank of Italy estimated a decrease in
total employment of about 1,271,000 units (with a reduction of
about 5%), which hit both employees and the self-employed. The
subsequent recovery, beginning in 1995, had not yet reabsorbed
the previous employment loss (+0.40% between 1995 and 1996,
Tab. 2).18
GRAPH. 6 - TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN ITALY
QUARTERLY DATA (X 1000). SERIES CORRECTED FOR “SEASONALITY”
Source: CNEL on data of Ministero del Lavoro.
With regards to the activity sector, the occupational crisis hit
agriculture heavily. Industry, in 1994 and 1995 lost respectively
2.4% and 1,7% of its workers (Tab. 2). The reduction in female
employment is lower than the male and it increases in the services
while male employment in this sector remained unchanged.
With regards to female and male employment, during the two
years of recession, male employment, roughly stable during the
‘80s, dropped sharply, while female employment, which had been
increasing rapidly in the last decade, fell only slightly.19
TAB. 2 - EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR AND GENDER - ITALY
(YEARLY PERCENTAGE VARIATION - 1993 = 100)
AGRICOLTURE INDUSTRY SERVICE TOTAL
Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total
1994 -4,5 -7,8 -5,7 -2,4 -0,9 -2,1 -1,5 -0,2 -1,0 -2,1 -1,0 -1,7
1995 -4,3 -7,0 -5,3 -1,7 -0,3 -1,4 0,1 1,2 0,6 -0,9 0,2 -0,5
1996 -4,3 -8,9 -5,9 -0,4 0,1 -0,3 0,4 3,1 1,6 -0,2 1,6 0,4
Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force, ISTAT.
In sum, it may be argued that during the last thirty years, the
main reason for unemployment has been due to the job loss in ag-
riculture and manufacturing. Only the service sector has been cre-
ating jobs; in this sector, due to relatively poor productivity per-
formance, the growth in output has been achieved by an increased
labour input, albeit not at the level seen in the USA, so that the
women’s access to the labour market has been lower than e x-
pected.
Moreover, following the oil crises in the ‘70s, Italian industry has
been engaged in a drawn-out adjustment process. The need to
save on energy costs, and, at the same time, to remain interna-
tionally competitive, spurred Italian industry to adopt the ‘just on
time’ or other more flexible models of production. To facilitate this
adjustment, stocks were cut down and service activities and pro-
duction components were decentralised to smaller firms able to
manage their labour force with greater flexibility.
In the tertiary sector the State performs an important role, but
employment, in this sector, has been declining since 1993. Indeed,
under budgetary constraints, many public administrative depart-
ments have hired only to replace (even if not entirely) retiring em-
ployees.
This decline damages southern regions in particular, where the
majority of workers are employed in the public sector (33% in the
South, 21% in the North and 29% in the Centre, Tab. 3).20
TAB. 3 - EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR AND TERRITORIAL AREA
1996 - ITALY
NORTH CENTRE SOUTH ITALY
Agricolture 4,9% 4,8% 12,3% 7,0%
Industry 38,5% 28,4% 23,5% 32,2%
Energy and water 2,8% 4,8% 5,2% 3,7%
Manufacture 78,6% 70,4% 51,8% 71,7%
Construction 18,6% 24,8% 43,0% 24,7%
Other activities 35,9% 38,0% 31,5% 35,1%
Commerce 46,4% 46,5% 53,4% 48,2%
Hotels and restaurants 13,2% 11,6% 11,7% 12,5%
Transport and communications 14,5% 15,8% 16,8% 15,4%
Credit insurance and financial management 11,3% 12,0% 7,6% 10,5%
Other services for enterprises 14,6% 14,2% 10,5% 13,5%
PA 20,7% 28,8% 32,7% 25,7%
Public administration 22,3% 34,0% 33,6% 29,0%
Education, health and other social services 52,4% 44,8% 52,4% 50,7%
Other public services 25,3% 21,2% 14,0% 20,3%
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force, ISTAT.
The damage is far more serious for young people in the South
as, in recent times, the public sector has granted the only ‘regular’
employment in this area, on which young people in the South have
built their own human capital and their own aspirations. The wish
to find regular employment in the public sector can be considered
one of the reasons for the high reservation wage in the South.
In conclusion the low rate of employment in Italy is mainly due
to the low level of female employment. Moreover, in addition to the
demand factors mentioned above, the access of women to the la-
bour market still comes up against several obstacles such as dis-
crimination by employers, even if it is not explicit, a cultural back-
wardness, that decreases the Italian female labour supply in com-
parison with all other European countries and the lack of infra-
structure or of contractual agreements that favour women’s role in
the family as well as in the labour market. For instance, the Italian
part-time worker percentage out of total employment is the lowest
in Europe, and this is greater for women (Graph. 7), even if, be-
tween 1987 and 1995, the number of part-time workers increased
steadily (Graph. 8).21
GRAPH. 7 - PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT BY GENDER - 1995
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Source: based on OECD data.
GRAPH. 8 - PART-TIME CONTRACTS. ITALY 1987-95
Source: CNEL on data of Ministero del Lavoro.22
The activity rate
Another structural aspect of the Italian labour market concerns
the low participation rate (Graph. 9). In international terms, Italy
(59.6%) has a lower rate, higher than the Spanish rate (59.3%)
only (Graph. 10). On the other hand, all European rates are infe-
rior to that of the United States where almost 80% of the aged
working population is employed or is actively seeking a job.
GRAPH. 9 - THE PARTICIPATION RATE (1960-1993)















































GRAPH. 10 - THE PARTICIPATION RATE - 1995















Source: based on OECD data.
This difference is due essentially to the modest growth of the
female participation rate particularly (Graph. 11) in Mediterranean
countries.
GRAPH. 11 - THE FEMALE PARTICIPATION RATE (1960-1995)































In Graph. 12 it can be seen that, although the gap between
men and women in Italy has been reduced, the difference in the
participation rate still remains at 32 percentage points.





































































































































































































The reason for the low female activity rate is not only the dis-
couraged worker hypothesis but also the basic cultural conditions
and lack of infrastructures and services. In fact, until 1973 the re-
duction in the female participation rate arose from the transforma-
tion of and the decrease in female employment in the agricultural
sector. After 1973 Italian women partially benefited from opportu-
nities in the development of the service sector as in the USA. This
is due to the lack of infrastructure and of a cultural heritage which
deems the work of men a right and a duty and the work of women
an optional. Another reason regards the wage expected: women
have gained, but not completely, a differential wage compared to
men.
During the employment crisis in the nineties (Graph. 13)  the
pattern of the female participation rate has been growing even if25
women’s employment has been declining. This does not mean
that there are no signs of ‘discouragement’, but simply that also in
this period, the steady increase in the female activity rate seems to
persist.
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Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force.
Nevertheless, this process is still insufficient and slower in the
South where women are less active. As Mazzotta and Nese (1997)
point out, women in the South are no more discriminated against
than those in the North, their smaller participation in the labour
market depends on the cultural heritage and inefficiency of social
services
2.
                                                
2. In this research a multinomial logit model has been implemented to estimate
the likelihood of being unemployed, the likelihood of being employed and the
likelihood of being left out of the labour force. Results show that the likelihood
of being left out of the labour market for women living in the South is greater
than for women living in the Centre-North (a difference of the estimated prob-
ability of 12%).while the difference between the likelihood of being employed
is not statistically different even if it is lower for women living in the South (-2%).26
In conclusion we assume that Italian women are moving closer
to male models of labour participation. However, this process
works less in the South where factors such as the employers dis-
crimination or greater difficulties in combining work and family are
more prevalent. The hypothesis may be confirmed by pointing out
that female employment rate differentials between the Centre-
North and South are mainly due to lower participation in southern
regions (Graph. 16). Others (European Commission 1996) attrib-
ute the lower female participation to the lack of more flexible job
contracts, such as part-time work.
The unemployment rate
As regards the unemployment rate, Italy and Europe have been
suffering from a constant increase in unemployment since the end
of the ’70s, while the U.S. unemployment rate has a more cyclical
course (Graph 14).
GRAPH. 14 - THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (1960-1995)































The difference between the Italian unemployment rate and
other European countries is small (Graph. 15), but specific prob-
lems are:
*  increasing dispersion among regional unemployment rates;
*  steep increases in structural unemployment for women and
young people;
*  sharp rises in long-term unemployment.












Source: based on OECD data.
2.  North South dualism
As stated above, there are very strong similarities regarding the
dynamics of the unemployment rate in the eighties and the first
half of the nineties between the EU countries. During this time, the
unemployment rate in Italy was on average 10%, (Tab. 4) a level
not much different to that of most of the twelve member countries
of the European Union. At the same time, only Spain (19,9%) and
Ireland (15,8%) recorded an unemployment rate higher than that
of Italy, while other countries: Germany (6,7%), Portugal (6,3%),
Greece (7,7%), and Great Britain (9,8%), the unemployment rate
was slightly lower.28
TAB. 4 - THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF ‘EU’ COUNTRIES














Source: based on EUROSTAT data.
What, on the contrary, differentiates the Italian labour market
from its European partners is the regional allocation of unemploy-
ment. If we consider the simple difference between the maximum
and minimum regional unemployment rate, as a measure of the
territorial discrepancies, we find that Italy (and also Spain) has
very high levels compared with its European partners. In Italy, in
particular, this difference was, at the time in point, 23,6% on aver-
age, compared to 22.9% in Spain, while in the other countries the
rate never topped 13% (Tab. 5).
TAB. 5 - THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF ‘EU’ COUNTRIES











Source: based on EUROSTAT data.29
This striking regional dualism is one of the most structural
characteristics of the Italian economy and in the last twenty years
it has been defined as a regional differential in unemployment lo-
cation. If we refer to ISTAT data, from 1961 to 1995, we note an
increasing difference in the level of use of the labour force b e-
tween different areas in the country, and it has been increasing in
recent times (Graph. 16).














In 1960 the unemployment rate in Italy was 5.5% and the dif-
ference between that of the South (6,6%) and the North (5,3%)
was about one percent. The unemployment rate in the South grew
considerably over the years compared to other areas in the coun-
try. In 1995, therefore, the percentage of jobless people in south-
ern Italy (27,2%) was twenty percent higher than in the North
(7,1%), and the situation worsened, particularly since the mid-
eighties. In fact, since that date the unemployment rate in the
South doubled from 13.9% in 1986 to 27.2% in 1995.
An analysis of Graph. 17 notes that from 1981 to 1995 the ac-30
tivity rate was almost constant in all regions, while the employment
rate was virtually stable in the Centro-Nord and decreasing in the
Mezzogiorno. An overall view of the development of regional dif-
ferentials might be examined through the indexes of the regional
variability of labour market variables. The index considered is the
normalised mean square error (SQT) for each year related to the
unemployment rate (TU), the activity rate (TA) and employ-
ment/population ratio (TOP). The time series of the SQT shows if
the regional differentials of the variables have been increasing or
decreasing.
GRAPH. 17 - THE ACTIVITY RATE (TA) AND THE EMPLOYMENT RATE (TOP)
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Source: Amendola, Caroleo, Coppola, (1997).
Regarding the unemployment rate, the dynamics of the (SQT)
show an increase in the regional differential throughout the period
concerned (Graph. 18). In particular, after a prolonged phase of
progressive expansion in the sixties and seventies, a reduction in
the regional differentials can be seen in the early eighties, due to31
the positive performance of the labour market in the southern re-
gions. Since 1984 regional variability greatly increased, underlining
a substantial increase in regional differentials. Today, therefore,
the regional differentials in the unemployment rate are a great deal
more marked than at the end of the seventies.
As regards the employment rate (TOP), the SQT shows:
1) a marked and prolonged reduction in the regional differentials
up to the beginning of the seventies;
2) an increase in the differences with strong accelerations, as a
consequence of the two oil crises, in the seventies and eighties;
3) in the last decade, a substantial stabilisation at a high level of
the differences in the regional variability of the employment
rate.
The activity rate, however, shows a very different picture. In
Graph. 18 we can note a tendency in the long term to a reduction
in regional differences in the labour supply. This phenomenon is
markedly due to regional dynamicsinf the female labour supply.
GRAPH. 18 - NORMALISED MEAN SQUARE ERROR OF: THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE














Source: Amendola, Caroleo, Coppola, (1997).32
In sum, in Italy, the increasing convergence in the regional la-
bour supply trend does not correspond to an analogous conver-
gence in employment opportunities. Therefore, the Italian labour
market presents an increasing inequality in the regional distribu-
tion of supply and demand that, in the more disadvantaged areas,
exacerbates the emergence of increasing quotas of hidden unem-
ployment. This phenomenon is undoubtedly more evident primarily
from the early eighties. It seems, therefore, that the North-South
dualism in the labour market has been sharpened by the negative
trend in labour demand in southern Italy.
The nation-wide indicators of the labour market in Italy, as has
been said above, show great differences between the North and
South. In Central and Northern regions, the unemployment rate in
1996 was between 7% and 10%, but in the South the rate was
over 21% (Graph. 19). Moreover, in the South, labour participation
is also low, especially for women (37% in the North and Centre,
28% in the South) (Graph. 19), and this suggests that the potential
labour force is even greater than that recorded in official statistics.
As we have already said (Mazzotta, Nese, 1997) possible reasons
for this phenomenon in part, may be cultural and due to the ineffi-
ciency of social services.
In Italy about 50% of the men of working age are employed, but
only a quarter of women have a job and there are notable differ-
ences in the dynamics of employment in different geographical ar-
eas. The male employment rate is 60% in the North and 50% in
the South, while the female employment rate range is 35% and
19% (Graph. 19).33
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Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force.
During the recession (1993-1994), in the North, the reduction in
the number of employed is ascribed largely to the decrease in
male workers (-1,7% for male and -0,5% for female) (Graph. 20)
while in the Centre it mainly concerns both male and female work-
ers (-1,8% for male and -1,2 for female). In the South, as in the
Centre, this reduction regards male workers (-6.2%), but the em-
ployment reduction persists also in the recovery phase (-0.6%
from ’95 to ’96) (Graph. 20).34
GRAPH. 20 - YEARLY EMPLOYMENT VARIATION BY GENDER












































Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force.35
With regards to activity sectors, in the Centre there is a larger
service sector (67%) (Graph. 21). The North has a higher quota of
those employed in industry (38.5%) and in the South agriculture,
generally in decline, takes up a higher quota of workers (12.2%)
than the rest of the country.
























Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force.
During the period ’93 - ’96 in Southern Italy the most notable
decrease in the number of employed was in the agricultural sector
(-8,8% in ‘96) (Tab. 11).36
TAB. 6 - EMPLOYMENT YEARLY VARIATION (1993-1996) (ITALY)
NORTH
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY SERVICES TOTAL
yearly average
 '93 595  - 4.067  - 5.740  - 10.401  -
 '94 558 -6,2% 4.029 -0,9% 5.687 -0,9% 10.274 -1,2%
 '95 545 -2,3% 3.977 -1,3% 5.772 1,5% 10.294 0,2%
 '96 509 -6,6% 3.998 0,5% 5.878 1,8% 10.385 0,9%
CENTRE
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY SERVICES TOTAL
yearly average
 '93 229  - 1.183  - 2.675  - 4.087  -
 '94 223 -2,6% 1.150 -2,9% 2.649 -1,0% 4.022 -1,6%
 '95 206 -7,7% 1.161 1,0% 2.653 0,2% 4.020 0,0%
 '96 195 -5,3% 1.148 -1,1% 2.702 1,8% 4.045 0,6%
SOUTH
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY SERVICES TOTAL
yearly average
 '93 845  - 1.475  - 3.660  - 5.979  -
 '94 793 -6,2% 1.408 -4,5% 3.623 -1,0% 5.824 -2,6%
 '95 765 -3,5% 1.357 -3,7% 3.600 -0,6% 5.721 -1,8%
 '96 697 -8,8% 1.328 -2,1% 3.631 0,9% 5.656 -1,1%
ITALY
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY SERVICES TOTAL
yearly average
 '93 1.669  - 6.725  - 12.074  - 20.468  -
 '94 1.574 -5,7% 6.587 -2,1% 11.959 -0,9% 20.120 -1,7%
 '95 1.516 -3,7% 6.495 -1,4% 12.025 0,6% 20.036 -0,4%
 '96 1.401 -7,6% 6.474 -0,3% 12.211 1,5% 20.086 0,3%
Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force.
The distribution of temporary employment (Tab. 7), is almost
the same in the North as in the Centre (4.2%) while it is greater in
the South (8%). The high percentage of temporary workers in the
South is due to the number of those employed in the agricultural
sector, where there is a large demand for seasonal workers. The
rate of temporary workers in agriculture, in Southern Italy, is 20%
and these workers are predominantly women.37
TAB. 7 - FIXED TERM AND PART-TIME CONTRACTS, BY AREA, GENDER AND SEC-
TOR - ITALY - 1996 (% OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT)
WORKERS
Fixed term Part time
North Centre South Italy North Centre South Italy
By gender
Male 3,2 3,2 7,3 4,5 2,5 2,7 3,9 3,0
Female 5,8 5,6 10,1 6,7 13,9 12,4 9,7 12,6
TOTAL 4,2 4,2 8,1 5,3 7,0 6,3 5,6 6,4
By sector
A 4,3 5,6 19,9 12,3 10,6 10,3 13,1 11,8
I 3,7 3,7 9,1 4,8 3,9 4,4 3,9 4,0
s 4,6 4,2 5,5 4,8 8,7 6,8 4,7 7,1
Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force.
As concerns part-time employment, there is a certain homoge-
neity in area (between 6% and 7%). In the North a greater
“feminisation” of part-time work can be noted (Tab. 7). In fact
13.9% of northern women workers have a part-time job (12.4% in
the Centre and 9.7% in the South).
In the Mezzogiorno there is a structurally dependent economy,
where consumption is sustained artificially by transfer of resources
from outside (Leonardi, 1995). Several factors such as the lack of
infrastructure, high transport costs and the effect of organised
crime, have hindered the growth of business in the South. These
obstacles have impeded inflows of private capital investment, both
Italian and foreign. (Oneto, 1995). Nationwide collective bargaining
has been deemed insufficient to compensate for the gap in pro-
ductivity. Only thanks to social contribution relief for employers
were unit labour costs in manufacturing kept in line with the rest of
the country.
Another factor contributing to the difference in labour costs
between the Centre-North and South is the distribution of non-
regular employment. Non regular jobs now represent some 34% of
total employment in the South (33% in 1980) (European Commis-
sion, 1996), against 18% in the Centre-North. Non regular or un-
registered workers are most common in agriculture and in con-
struction.38
Finally, whereas in northern Italy the bulk of the jobless are un-
employed workers (i.e. dismissed workers), in the South the larg-
est group is composed of first-time job seekers (50%) (Tab. 8),
moreover, the gap particularly concerns those aged 15-29 (Graph.
22). In particular, the unemployment rate differential between the
Centre-North and South is more marked for men than women up
to the age of 30. While participation rate differentials persist only
for women -the female participation rate in the South is lower.
TAB. 8 - UNEMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE AND AREA - ITALY - 1996
Unemployment First time seekers Other seekers TOTAL
Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total
NORTH 148 185 333 91 138 229 41 132 173 280 455 735
perc 53% 41% 45% 33% 30% 31% 15% 29% 24%
CENTRE 91 81 172 95 102 197 20 75 95 206 258 464
perc 44% 31% 37% 46% 40% 42% 10% 29% 20%
SOUTH 355 151 506 444 334 778 50 230 280 849 715 1564
perc 42% 21% 32% 52% 47% 50% 6% 32% 18%
Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force.39
GRAPH. 22 - UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, PARTICIPATION RATE AND EMPLOYMENT
































































Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force.40
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To summarise, higher unemployment of the young and a lower
female participation rate are the main structural features that dif-
ferentiate the Mezzogiorno from the Centre-North. In the latter, the
reason for scant female participation in the labour market, and
consequently the lower female employment rate in the South, are
due to a lack of social services and infrastructures and cultural
heritage. Below we shall describe some features of youth unem-
ployment.
3.  Labour market by age group
Tab. 9 shows the unemployment rate by age for the relevant
industrialised country. In 1995 there was illustrates a high degree
of youth unemployment, except for Germany. Compared with the
other European countries, Italy has however a very high youth un-
employment rate, lower only to that of Spain.
In the long term, the youth unemployment rate substantially in-
creased in all countries; particularly between 1983 and 1995 it
ranged from 30.5% to 32.8% in Italy, from 19.7% to 25.9 % in
France and from 37.6% to 42.5% in Spain.
During the same period, in another group of countries (Ger-
many, UK, USA), where in general, policies favouring young peo-
ple have been successfully undertaken, there was, on the con-
trary, a decrease.TAB. 9 - THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY AGE - 1983-1995 - PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES
TOTAL
1983 1994 1995
FROM 55 TO 64 FROM 25 TO 54 FROM 15 TO 24 FROM 55 TO 64 FROM 25 TO 54 FROM 15 TO 24 FROM 55 TO 64 FROM 25 TO 54 FROM 15 TO 24
______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________
USA 5,7 8,0 17,2 4,1 5,0 12,5 3,6 4,5 12,1
SPAIN 7,4 11,5 37,6 12,3 20,9 42,8 20,0 20,0 42,5
UK  -  -  - 9,1 8,3 16,2 7,6 7,4 15,5
FRANCE 6,3 5,7 19,7 7,0 11,2 27,5 7,2 10,5 25,9
GERMANY 8,9 6,9 11,0 11,6 8,0 8,3 11,6 7,7 8,5
ITALY 2,9 4,5 30,5 2,2 8,1 32,4 4,3 8,9 32,8
MALE
1983 1994 1995
FROM 55 TO 64 FROM 25 TO 54 FROM 15 TO 24 FROM 55 TO 64 FROM 25 TO 54 FROM 15 TO 24 FROM 55 TO 64 FROM 25 TO 54 FROM 15 TO 24
______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________
USA 6,1 8,2 18,4 4,4 4,9 13,2 3,6 4,4 12,5
SPAIN 8,8 11,5 33,7 13,3 16,4 37,4 12,6 15,3 37,0
UK 10,1 9,3 22,4 11,6 9,8 19,1 10,1 8,5 17,9
FRANCE 6,0 4,4 15,0 7,3 9,7 24,2 7,7 8,8 21,0
GERMANY 9,0 6,3 10,4 10,7 6,6 8,3 10,4 6,3 8,7
ITALY 1,9 2,7 25,5 2,2 6,0 29,1 4,1 6,7 29,0
FEMALE
1983 1994 1995
FROM 55 TO 64 FROM 25 TO 54 FROM 15 TO 24 FROM 55 TO 64 FROM 25 TO 54 FROM 15 TO 24 FROM 55 TO 64 FROM 25 TO 54 FROM 15 TO 24
______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________
USA 5,1 7,7 15,8 3,9 5,0 11,6 3,6 4,5 11,6
SPAIN 2,9 11,6 43,7 9,8 28,4 50,1 11,4 37,5 49,1
UK  -  -  - 5,4 6,4 12,6 3,9 6,1 12,5
FRANCE 6,9 7,7 25,5 6,7 13,1 31,6 6,6 12,6 32,2
GERMANY 8,6 8,0 11,7 13,4 10,0 8,2 13,7 9,4 8,2
ITALY 6,0 8,3 36,5 2,1 11,7 36,5 4,9 12,6 37,644
In the debate on youth unemployment it is often stressed how
its effects are generally alleviated by the “support” the young get
from the family. In addition this “support”, in raising their ‘reserva-
tion wage’ (i.e. the expected minimum wage to accept a job), al-
lows them to wait for long periods before finding more suitable
jobs.
Moreover, research on reservation wage estimation in Italy
(Mazzotta 1996) shows that it is higher and significative in South.
However the level of significativity is lower for the re-entrants and
job-losers than the re-entrants (Tabs. 10a - 10d). In other words,
the higher reservation wage in southern Italy depends mainly on
first-time job seekers.45
TAB. 10a - ESTIMATION OF RESERVATION WAGE





SOUTH 0,1637 4,900 *** 5,116 ***
CENTRE 0,0522 1,652 * 1,997 **
AGE
15-30 -0,0274 -0,653 -0,627
31-40 -0,0287 -0,854 -0,855
SEX
FEMALE -0,0712 -3,033 *** -3,096 ***
RELATION WITH HEAD OF FAMLY
HEADFAMILY 0,1448 1,751 * 1,177
SPOUSE 0,1032 1,268 0,873
SON 0,1197 1,516 0,979
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
UNIVERSITY 0,2181 5,271 *** 5,587 ***
UPPER SECONDARY 0,0677 3,364 *** 3,336 ***
NONE OR ELEMENTARY -0,0562 -1,854 * 1,837 *
WORK EXSPERIENCE
YES -0,0888 -2,870 *** -2,773 ***
AVAILABILITY TO WORK
NOT IMMEDIATELY -0,0100 -0,174 -0,216
TO ADEGUATE CONDITION -0,0037 -0,192 -0,180
MONTHS FROM LAST RESEARCH -0,0035 -0,651 -0,903
N. OF RESEARCH ACTIONS
2-3 acts -0,0101 -0,483 -0,474
4- 5 acts 0,0795 1,967 ** 1,654 *
more acts -0,0101 -0,121 -0,144
RESEARCH INTENSITY 0,0167 1,180 1,394
MOBILITY
OUT OF PLACE OF RESIDENCE 0,0623 3,383 *** 3,303 ***
DURATION OF DISCOURAGEMENT  -0,0002 -0,421 -0,483
TYPE OF JOB TIME PREFERRED
ONLY FULL-TIME 0,1903 7,757 *** 8,224 ***
PREFERABLY FULL-TIME 0,1052 4,406 *** 4,229 ***
ONLY PART-TIME -0,0779 -2,338 ** -2,168 **
LOG(UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION) -0,0046 -0,624 -0,623
CONDITION BEFORE THE SEARCH
LABOUR FORCE 0,11485 3,460 *** 3,134 ***
SECTOR PREFERRED
ONLY PRIVATE -0,0046 -0,241 -0,243
ONLY PUBLIC 0,0080 0,173 0,200
EVERAGE UNEMP.RATE (JAN. '94- JAN-'95) -0,1284 -1,593 -1,603
LOG(TOTAL N. FAMLILY'S COMPONENT -0,0554 -0,997 -1,134
LOG (N. UNEMPLOYMENT IN FAMILY) 0,0197 0,418 0,510
COSTANT 13,9220 125,623 97,818
Source: Mazzotta (1996) on Quarterly Survey of Labour Force data, ISTAT.46
TAB. 10b - ESTIMATION OF RESERVATION WAGE





SOUTH 0,179 3,909 *** 4,628 ***
CENTRE 0,019 2,039 ** 2,599 ***
AGE
15-30 0,037 0,559 0,739
31-40 0,026 0,436 0,539
SEX
FEMALE -0,042 -1,595 -1,829 *
RELATION WITH HEAD OF FAMLY
HEADFAMILY 0,264 2,359 ** 1,228
SPOUSE 0,247 2,347 ** 1,196
SON 0,219 2,165 ** 1,040
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
UNIVERSITY 0,243 5,533 *** 5,473 ***
UPPER SECONDARY 0,094 4,056 *** 3,794 ***
NONE OR ELEMENTARY 0,013 0,293 0,354
WORK EXSPERIENCE
YES  -  -    -
AVAILABILITY TO WORK
NOT IMMEDIATELY -0,009 -0,140 -0,163
TO ADEGUATE CONDITION -0,023 -1,008 -1,032
MONTHS FROM LAST RESEARCH 0,001 0,088 0,125
N. OF RESEARCH ACTIONS
2-3 acts -0,010 -0,382 -0,385
4- 5 acts 0,029 0,591   0,402
more acts -0,073 -0,789 -0,846
RESEARCH INTENSITY 0,023 1,266 1,427
MOBILITY
OUT OF PLACE OF RESIDENCE 0,037 1,674 * 1,644 *
DURATION OF DISCOURAGEMENT  -0,001 -0,592 -0,868
TYPE OF JOB TIME PREFERRED
ONLY FULL-TIME 0,161 5,602 *** 6,213 ***
PREFERABLY FULL-TIME 0,090 3,166 *** 2,926 ***
ONLY PART-TIME -0,064 -1,569   -1,514
Log(unemployment duration)
LOG(UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION) -0,017 -1,582 -1,501
CONDITION BEFORE THE SEARCH
LABOUR FORCE  -  -    -  
SECTOR PREFERRED
ONLY PRIVATE -0,042 -1,821 * -1,921 *
ONLY PUBLIC -0,042 -0,858 -0,929
EVERAGE UNEMP.RATE (JAN. '94- JAN-'95) -0,182 -1,919 * -2,233 **
LOG(TOTAL N. FAMLILY'S COMPONENT -0,058 -0,841 -0,894
LOG (N. UNEMPLOYMENT IN FAMILY) 0,014 0,251 0,286
COSTANT 13,817 94,499 62,265
Source: Mazzotta (1996) on Quarterly Survey of Labour Force data, ISTAT.47
TAB. 10c - ESTIMATION OF RESERVATION WAGE





SOUTH 0,131 1,519 1,607
CENTRE 0,033 0,403 0,563
AGE
15-30 -0,219 -2,216 ** -1,701 *
31-40 -0,153 -2,171 ** -2,308 **
SEX
FEMALE -0,105 -1,450 -1,182
RELATION WITH HEAD OF FAMLY
HEADFAMILY 0,104 0,582 1,225
SPOUSE 0,077 0,430 0,826
SON 0,153 0,893 1,606
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
UNIVERSITY 0,228 1,465 1,986 **
UPPER SECONDARY 0,037 0,625 0,584
NONE OR ELEMENTARY -0,176 -2,522 ** -2,975 ***
WORK EXSPERIENCE
YES  -  -  -
AVAILABILITY TO WORK
NOT IMMEDIATELY -0,121 -0,734 -1,516
TO ADEGUATE CONDITION -0,005 -0,104 -0,110
MONTHS FROM LAST RESEARCH -0,020 -0,925 -1,313
N. OF RESEARCH ACTIONS
2-3 acts -0,084 -1,465 -1,563
4- 5 acts 0,153 1,347 2,112 **
more acts 0,214 0,949 1,991 **
RESEARCH INTENSITY 0,015 0,406 0,517
MOBILITY
OUT OF PLACE OF RESIDENCE 0,183 3,370 *** 3,357 ***
DURATION OF DISCOURAGEMENT   -  -    -
TYPE OF JOB TIME PREFERRED
ONLY FULL-TIME 0,244 3,578 *** 4,140 ***
PREFERABLY FULL-TIME 0,121 1,845 * 1,939 *
ONLY PART-TIME -0,130 -1,310 -1,559
Log(unemployment duration)
LOG(UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION) 0,012 0,602 0,618
CONDITION BEFORE THE SEARCH
LABOUR FORCE  -  -  -
SECTOR PREFERRED
ONLY PRIVATE 0,066 1,291 1,493
ONLY PUBLIC 0,085 0,549 0,712
EVERAGE UNEMP.RATE (JAN. '94- JAN-'95) 0,208 0,815 0,539
LOG(TOTAL N. FAMLILY'S COMPONENT -0,206 -1,391 1,740 *
LOG (N. UNEMPLOYMENT IN FAMILY) 0,111 0,854 1,125
BENEFITS 0,102 1,390 2,037 **
YES
POSITION IN PRECEEDING WORK -0,131 -1,141 -1,859 *
EMPLOYEES
REASON FOR LOST THE JOB 0,144 1,319 1,978 **
FIRING 0,094 0,873 1,273
ININTENTIONAL 0,141 1,086 1,890 *
VOLONTARY
COSTANT 14,029 51,599 81,629
Source: Mazzotta (1996) on Quarterly Survey of Labour Force data, ISTAT.48
TAB. 10d - ESTIMATION OF RESERVATION WAGE





SOUTH 0,1647 1,981 ** 2,033 **
CENTRE -0,0151 -0,199 -0,270
AGE
15-30 0,0712 0,713 0,882
31-40 0,0088 0,123 0,139
SEX
FEMALE -0,1978 -2,463 ** -3,154 ***
RELATION WITH HEAD OF FAMLY
HEADFAMILY -0,1253 -0,458 -0,842
SPOUSE -0,2087 -0,771 -1,516
SON -0,1644 -0,611 -1,207
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
UNIVERSITY 0,2870 1,800 * 2,251 **
UPPER SECONDARY 0,0122 0,198 0,279
NONE OR ELEMENTARY -0,0392 -0,558 -0,563
WORK EXSPERIENCE
YES  -  -    -
AVAILABILITY TO WORK
NOT IMMEDIATELY 0,6158 2,241 ** 5,036 ***
TO ADEGUATE CONDITION 0,1214 2,069 ** 1,936 *
MONTHS FROM LAST RESEARCH -0,0339 -1,482 -1,224
N. OF RESEARCH ACTIONS
2-3 acts 0,0778 1,318 1,305
4- 5 acts 0,2610 2,501 ** 3,417 ***
more acts 0,3021 0,809 2,245 **
RESEARCH INTENSITY -0,0150 -0,407 -0,471
MOBILITY
OUT OF PLACE OF RESIDENCE 0,0639 1,246 1,310
DURATION OF DISCOURAGEMENT  0,0015 1,305 1,644
TYPE OF JOB TIME PREFERRED
ONLY FULL-TIME 0,2372 3,319 *** 3,162 ***
PREFERABLY FULL-TIME 0,1578 2,391 ** 2,607 **
ONLY PART-TIME -0,0856 -0,984 -0,966
Log(unemployment duration)
LOG(UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION) -0,0077 -0,363 -0,566
CONDITION BEFORE THE SEARCH
LABOUR FORCE  -  -    -
SECTOR PREFERRED
ONLY PRIVATE 0,0462 0,911 0,862
ONLY PUBLIC 0,0219 0,099 0,274
EVERAGE UNEMP.RATE (JAN. '94- JAN-'95) -0,1791 -0,668 -0,834
LOG(TOTAL N. FAMLILY'S COMPONENT 0,0222 0,149 0,212
LOG (N. UNEMPLOYMENT IN FAMILY) -0,0806 -0,058 -0,084
BENEFITS
YES -0,0364 -0,377 -0,634
POSITION IN PRECEEDING WORK
EMPLOYEES -0,0287 -0,271 -0,388
REASON FOR LOST THE JOB  
FIRING 0,0869 0,904 1,260
ININTENTIONAL -0,0189 -0,197 -0,277
VOLONTARY -0,1100 -1,098 -1,610
COSTANT 14,0990 42,175 63,325
Source: Mazzotta (1996) on Quarterly Survey of Labour Force data, ISTAT.49
A further significant result of estimations is that the unemployed
reservation wage in the South is not selected, therefore the reser-
vation wages expected, without correction, are no different from
the average reservation wage of the population. Therefore, the
theory of job search finds no confirmation. In other words, the un-
employed do not claim reservation wages statistically different and
higher than those of the rest of the population (employed). A c-
cordingly, if we consider only the southern labour market, unem-
ployment does not depend on high reservation wage of unem-
ployed (Tab. 11).
TAB. 11 - SAMPLE SELECTION - COEFFICIENTS OF THE MILL’S RATIOS (GLS)
COEFFICIENTS T-RATIO COEFFICIENTS T-RATIO
TOTAL
N. 12447;N. UNE. 1710
LAMBDA 0,056277 1,487 0,055505 1,480
EXCLUDED ON JOB SEARCH
N. 12133; N.UNE. 1710
LAMBDA 0,055115 1,472 0,054316 1,465
ONLY FULL TIME
N. 11128; N UNEM
LAMBDA 0,060548 1,383 0,061405 1,425
NORTH
N. 5685; N.UNE. 324
LAMBDA 0,064735 0,947 0,05477 0,824
CENTRE
N. 2345; N.UNE. 261
LAMBDA 0,085679 1,237 0,088989 1,279
SOUTH
N. 4093; N.UNE. 1124
LAMBDA 0,030862 0,507 0,030969 0,508
Source: Mazzotta (1996) on Quarterly Survey on Labour Force.
Regional differentials in reservation wages may be due to the
fact that, although average wages in the South are lower than in
Centre-North, the public sector wages of men aged under 35 are
higher in the South (CNEL 1994, Mazzotta, 1996) (Tab. 12). Oth-50
ers (Ghignoni, 1997) point out that unemployed in the South might
take moving costs into account.
TAB. 12 - RETRIBUTIVE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR
(1989)
AGE
<= 35 YEARS OLD  > 35 YEARS OLD
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE
AREA
NORTH WEST -3,1 -13,8  -0,7  3,2
NORTH EAST  2,5  -5,8 13,9  9,0
CENTRE  4,9  -9,6  -1,1 -7,1
SOUTH 11,1  -2,3 18,2  9,0
Source: CNEL, 1994, Dati Banca d’Italia.
An important aspect that must take into account is that the res-
ervation wage estimated in the survey depends on the fact that in-
dividuals demand a fixed and regular job and seek only this kind of
job.
In substance the higher wages required in South are mainly
due to the behaviour of the first-time labour market entrants:
younger unemployed who are much more influenced by ‘regular
wages’. In the South, the “regular wage” signal presumably corre-
sponds to the public sector wage. The public sector in the 80’s ex-
panded greatly in Italy, especially in South and the increase in
employment was also connected to an expanding increased wage
policy. Furthermore, as stated above, for males under 35 the re-
tributive bonus in public sector is higher in Southern regions (Tab.
12).
A further “signal” may come from the informal labour market,
unstable and low paid. As several surveys both in Italy and abroad
have shown, people working in the informal sector are not newly
unemployed. There are, on the contrary, primarly workers subject
to weak guarantees (redundant workers, pensioners) and also
workers with strong guarantees (employees with a steady job on51
the main labour market), because of the familial network they are
able to set in motion.
Moreover, as regards the role of the family, recent studies point
out that the financial support from families to young people in Italy,
are not greater than in other countries, such as the United States,
where the youth unemployment rate is lower (12,5%). Another
study on OECD countries (Employment Outlook, 1996) has shown
that the rate of young unemployed without have family support in-
creased markedly from the mid-'80s to early '90s. In Italy young
people who no longer depend on their family make up about 22%
of the young unemployed. Although, in southern regions in par-
ticular, families may act as support for young unemployed, this
effect has been weakening, due also to the increasing problems
that parents encounter in the labour market.
Generally, the Italian labour market has favoured the employ-
ment of more mature workers. This feature was usually ascribed
to lack of mobility: People consider a job as a ‘fortress’ in which
might be hard to get into but, once a job is obtained, it will be
harder to lose it. On the other hand, Italian labour market is char-
acterised by a high level of mobility; that can only be explained by
the predominance of small and medium-sized firms in all sectors
whose characteristic is a high turnover.
In sum, in the past, adult workers definitely benefited from a
very high level of job security, and it was always easier for them
than younger workers to find another job. In Italy, more than in
other countries, the best passport to a job has always been having
one. It must be said, however, that this mechanism has begun to
jam in recent years after the employment crisis.
In addition unemployment has increased in line with the number
of mature workers. In just three years (1993-1995) the number of
unemployment people aged over 30 has rose from 35% to 40%
out of total unemployment (European Commission, 1996). The
sharpest rise was registered in the 30-39 age group, where i n-
come need is greatest
3.
                                                
3. This phenomenon is becoming persistent. Time series (ISFOL, 1995) show
that, although young people make up the bulk of job seekers, their number
fell from 76% in 1978, to 73% in 1986 and 62% in 1994. The main decrease52
This is confirmed by Mazzotta (1997), who calculates the prob-
ability of remaining unemployed or getting a job, by the estimation
of a bivariate probit model of the labour force status at the end of
a period of time (Jan. ‘95) as a function of other individual vari-
ables surveyed at the beginning of the period (Jan. ‘94).
The first meaningful result is that, considering the flows
4, young
people (aged 15-19 and 20-30) are not disadvantaged by the hir-
ing preferences of employers towards older workers. The higher
probability of employment concerns middle aged people (31-40)
who are more incline to accept a job and more dependent on in-
come. This result also comes from the higher probability of house-
holders becoming employed (Tab. 13a-13c).
On the other hand, when stocks are considered (Tab. 13c), the
probability of employment is not linear and 31-40 aged people are
disadvantaged. In fact, they are mainly penalised by rigidities in
the labour market.
Broadly speaking, the variables which positively affect the like-
lihood of success are: the level of the  intensity of the search,
which actually represents a measure of the quantity of the search
and the number of job searches, at least more than 3. Such a re-
sult confirms the hypothesis that with an increase in the number of
‘contacts’, the likelihood to finding a job also increases.
The significant positive effect of the willingness to accept a job
under reasonably good conditions confirms how important it is to
have fairly clear ideas about organising and directing the search.
Whilst, those who are not available for work have significant likeli-
                                                                                                             
concerns young people aged 14-19 which fell from 31% in 1978, to 23% in
1986 and 12% in 1994. At the end of the period, therefore, we have an age-
ing of unemployed people and a growing number of unemployed with previ-
ous job employment.
4. It must be pointed out that in the “stock” analysis both dependent and inde-
pendent variables are surveyed at the same instant of time (January ’95),
while in the “flow” analysis the dependent variable consists of the status of a
worker at the end of the period concerned (January ’95) as a function of a set
of exogenous characteristics surveyed at the beginning of the period (January
’94). In other words the “stock” analysis estimates the probability of being
employed at a given instant of time, while the “flow” analysis estimates the
probability of a worker, having some characteristics at the beginning of the
period, to leave unemployment at the end of that period.53
hood of success; meaning that they can not work at present but
will work at a future.
The difficulty the unemployed have met with in finding a job in
the private sector (which has seen job losses in large private in-
dustry mainly in North) has been confirmed during the period of
time in point. Indeed, the likelihood of success of those who have
concentrated their efforts in the public employment sector is posi-
tive and relevant. However, a reversal of the trend has been fore-
cast for the future, as it results from the policies aimed at limiting
the public debt and favouring private enterprise.
Particularly interesting is the  family-job  ratio.  Those who are
members of a household with a greater number of unemployed
have met with growing difficulty in finding a job, while the trend is
reversed if we consider the number of those employed. In other
words, the theory stating that the network of information created
by the family positively affects the likelihood of finding a job, is
confirmed. We might say that ‘jobs attract jobs’. Such a result
agrees with Nickell’s (1979) where the number of people to be
supported lowers the likelihood of being employed.
The likelihood of success also decrease with the lengthening of
the period of unemployment.  Such a period corresponds to the
time of search and at the same time of unemployment. Therefore,
the more an individual is outside the world of production, the more
s/he is discouraged and labelled as unskilled worker, consequently
her/his likelihood of finding employment decreases progressively.
This result, together with the effect of age, highlights a new prob-
lem: the ageing of job seekers.
In Tab. 13b age is considered as a continuous variable (not
dummy) and shows how the likelihood of finding a job increases
up to the age of 33, then decreases (Graph. 23). As a conse-
quence of ageing of unemployment, we can notice (i) the relevant
average duration of job search of thove over 25 (41 months in the
South) -especially for the first-time job-seekers; and (ii) the growth
of the long term youth unemployment, which was 18%, in April '93,
while it reached 22%, in April '96 (Tabs. 14 e 15).54
TAB. 13a - EMPLOYMENT PROBABILITY
(TOTAL EMPLOYED - ITALY - OCTOBER 1994) N. 1410 (FLOW ANALYSIS)
Binomial Probit Model LM  statistic= 42,340
Maximum likelihood estimates CHI(31;0,05) 44,9850
Log-Likelihood,,,,,,,,,,,,,, -510,081
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L -648,6257
Variable Marginal t-ratio Mean of Std,Dev,of
effects X X
TERRITORIAL AREA
SOUTH -0,095 -4,090 *** 0,654 0,476
CENTRE -0,032 -1,247 0,159 0,366
AGE
15-19 -0,017 -0,367 0,659 0,474
20-30 0,042 1,221 0,204 0,403
31-40 0,088 2,762 ***
SEX
FEMALE -0,048 -2,259 ** 0,528 0,499
RELATION WITH HEAD OF FAMLY
HEADFAMILY 0,073 2,142 ** 0,190 0,392
SON -0,018 -0,587 0,607 0,489
JOB SEEKING CONDITION
JOB-LOSER 0,148 4,568 *** 0,327 0,469
FIRST JOB-SEEKERS 0,085 2,531 ** 0,480 0,500
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
UNIVERSITY -0,040 -1,025 0,055 0,228
UPPER SECONDARY -0,011 -0,526 0,374 0,484
NONE OR ELEMENTARY -0,054 -1,793 * 0,146 0,353
AVAILABILITY TO WORK
NOT IMMEDIATELY 0,143 2,391 ** 0,021 0,143
TO ADEGUATE CONDITION 0,041 2,216 ** 0,488 0,500
MONTHS FROM LAST RESEARCH -0,015 -1,956 * 1,611 1,572
N. OF RESEARCH ACTIONS
2-3 acts 0,022 1,083 0,316 0,465
4- 5 acts 0,060 1,766 * 0,069 0,254
more acts 0,096 1,576 0,014 0,117
RESEARCH INTENSITY
0,035 2,590 *** 1,279 0,638
MOBILITY
PLACE OF RESIDENCE 0,013 0,524 0,784 0,412
ANYWHERE 0,061 1,495 0,047 0,212
DURATION OF DISCOURAGEMENT 0,000 -0,638 3,293 12,932
TYPE OF JOB TIME PREFERRED
ONLY FULL-TIME 0,044 1,866 ** 0,322 0,468
PREFERABLY FULL-TIME 0,028 1,137 0,317 0,465
ONLY PART-TIME -0,042 -1,152 0,135 0,342
LOG(UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION)-0,023 -3,129 *** 2,782 1,271
SECTOR PREFERRED
ONLY PRIVATE 0,026 1,421 0,365 0,482
ONLY PUBLIC 0,132 2,961 *** 0,033 0,180
EMPLOYED IN FAMILY
LOG(N.OF UNEMPLOYED) -0,038 -2,395 ** 0,850 0,537
LOG(N.OF EMPLOYED) 0,074 5,404 *** -0,040 0,745
Constant -0,253 -3,758 ***
Source: Mazzotta (1997) on Quarterly Survey of Labour Force data, ISTAT.55
TAB. 13b - EMPLOYMENT PROBABILITY
(TOTAL EMPLOYED - ITALY - OCTOBER 1994) N. 1410 (FLOW ANALYSIS)
Maximum likelihood estimates Chi(30;0,01)= 50,892
Log-Likelihood,,,,,,,,,,,,,, -512,231
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L -648,625
Variable Coefficient Marginal t-ratio Mean of Std,Dev,of
effects X X
TERRITORIAL AREA
SOUTH -0,504 -0,096 -4,089 *** 0,654 0,476
CENTRE -0,147 -0,028 -1,073 0,159 0,366
AGE
AGE/100 8,650 1,641 2,506 ** 0,289 0,096
AGE^2/10000 -13,036 -2,474 -2,712 *** 0,093 0,066
SEX
FEMALE -0,251 -0,048 -2,224 ** 0,528 0,499
RELATION WITH HEAD OF FAMLY
HEADFAMILY 0,389 0,074 2,166 ** 0,190 0,392
SON -0,115 -0,022 -0,681 0,607 0,489
JOB SEEKING CONDITION
JOB-LOSER 0,780 0,148 4,548 *** 0,327 0,469
FIRST JOB-SEEKERS 0,448 0,085 2,520 ** 0,480 0,500
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
UNIVERSITY -0,227 -0,043 -1,051 0,055 0,228
UPPER SECONDARY -0,047 -0,009 -0,435 0,374 0,484
NONE OR ELEMENTARY -0,241 -0,046 -1,482 0,146 0,353
AVAILABILITY TO WORK
NOT IMMEDIATELY 0,756 0,143 2,397 ** 0,021 0,143
TO ADEGUATE CONDITION 0,220 0,042 2,216 ** 0,488 0,500
MONTHS FROM LAST RESEARCH -0,082 -0,016 -2,017 ** 1,611 1,572
N. OF RESEARCH ACTIONS
2-3 acts 0,110 0,021 1,027 0,316 0,465
4- 5 acts 0,309 0,059 1,734 * 0,069 0,254
more acts 0,472 0,090 1,460 0,014 0,117
RESEARCH INTENSITY
0,188 0,036 2,659 *** 1,279 0,638
MOBILITY
PLACE OF RESIDENCE 0,054 0,010 0,419 0,784 0,412
ANYWHERE 0,285 0,054 1,314 0,047 0,212
DURATION OF DISCOURAGEMENT -0,002 0,000 -0,540 3,293 12,932
TYPE OF JOB TIME PREFERRED
ONLY FULL-TIME 0,240 0,046 1,906 * 0,322 0,468
PREFERABLY FULL-TIME 0,154 0,029 1,167 0,317 0,465
ONLY PART-TIME -0,229 -0,043 -1,189 0,135 0,342
LOG(UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION) -0,121 -0,023 -3,094 *** 2,782 1,271
SECTOR PREFERRED
ONLY PRIVATE 0,129 0,024 1,334 0,365 0,482
ONLY PUBLIC 0,684 0,130 2,902 *** 0,033 0,180
EMPLOYED IN FAMILY
LOG(N.OF UNEMPLOYED) -0,213 -0,040 -2,517 ** 0,850 0,537
LOG(N.OF EMPLOYED) 0,375 0,071 5,206 *** -0,040 0,745
Constant -2,408 -0,457 -3,643
Source: Mazzotta (1997) on Quarterly Survey of Labour Force data, ISTAT.56
TAB. 13c - EMPLOYMENT PROBABILITY




Log-Likelihood         -3417.836
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L  -4981,082
Chi-Squared (14)        3126,492
Significance Level       0,0000000
VARIABLES                                                  MARGINAL
                                                                       EFFECTS

















UPPER SECONDARY 0,021 3.512***
NONE OR ELEMENTARY -0,025 -3,029***
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE(#) -0,477 -17,620***
LOG (N. OF MENBER OF FAMILY 0,033 2,829***
 + OF 2 MEMBER OF FAMILY
NOT EMPLOYED(§) -0,030 -4,076***
Constant 0,275 9,011***
(§) Excluded interviewed.
(#) Average Unemployment rate of Jan. ‘94-Jan. ‘95, by gender, by age, by educational level, by area.
Source: Mazzotta (1997) on Quarterly Survey of Labour Force data,  ISTAT.57





























Source: Mazzotta (1997) on ISTAT data.TAB. 14 - AVERAGE MONTHS FOR RESEARCH BY AGE, BY SEX AND TERRITORIAL AREA - ITALY (1996)
NORTH
Job losers/leavers First-time job seekers Others Total
*-------------------------------------* *-------------------------------------* *-------------------------------------* *-------------------------------------*
AGE Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
15-24 12 12 12 18 20 19 12 14 13 15 17 16
25-29 16 18 17 25 27 26 15 19 18 19 21 21
>29 23 22 23 36 36 36 17 25 24 24 24 24
CENTRE
Job losers/leavers First-time job seekers Others Total
*-------------------------------------* *-------------------------------------* *-------------------------------------* *-------------------------------------*
AGE Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
15-24 16 16 16 20 24 22 13 18 17 19 22 20
25-29 21 20 20 35 33 34 26 25 25 29 27 28
>29 29 26 27 38 38 38 21 30 30 30 29 30
SOUTH
Job losers/leavers First-time job seekers Others Total
*-------------------------------------* *-------------------------------------* *-------------------------------------* *-------------------------------------*
AGE Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
15-24 17 17 17 31 32 31 21 26 25 28 29 28
25-29 24 25 24 54 47 51 40 38 38 43 40 41
>29 28 26 28 68 69 54 37 42 42 40 41 40
Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force, ISTAT.59
TAB. 15 - LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT RATE - ITALY
(%)
MALE FEMALE TOTAL
15-24 TOTAL 15-24 TOTAL 15-24 TOTAL
April '93 15,2 4,4 21,0 9,2 17,8 6,2
July 15,8 4,5 22,2 9,4 18,6 6,3
October 17,1 4,9 22,8 9,7 19,7 6,7
January '94 16,6 5,0 22,5 9,6 19,1 6,6
April 17,5 5,4 22,7 10,1 19,8 7,1
July 17,7 5,5 23,3 10,1 20,1 7,2
October 18,2 5,7 23,8 10,9 20,7 7,6
January '95 18,2 5,8 24,5 10,6 21,0 7,6
April 18,4 5,8 25,1 10,8 21,3 7,7
July 18,6 6,0 26,1 11,1 22,3 7,9
October 18,4 6,0 25,7 11,1 21,7 7,9
January '96 17,5 6,0 24,9 11,0 20,7 7,9
April 19,0 6,2 26,6 11,4 22,4 8,2
Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force, ISTAT
Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force, ISTAT.
One specific feature of Italian unemployment, compared with
European levels, has always been the prevalence of young first-
time job seekers out of  the total unemployment (47% for men and
43% for women) (Tab. 16), mainly younger in the South (as we
have already seen) with a lower likelihood of finding a job (see
Tabs. 13a, 13c).
TAB. 16 - UNEMPLOYMENT BY TYPE  - 1961-1996 - ITALY
1961 1972 1981 1991 1995 1996
Men
First-time job seekers 29,6 46 57,9 56,5 46,9 47,3
Job losers/leavers 51,5 30,8 15 22,4 44,3 44,4
Others 18,8 23,2 27 21,1 8,8 8,3
Women
First-time job seekers 33,9 41,6 48 42,4 38,7 43
Job losers/leavers 19,1 9,3 8,7 14 27,1 29,2
Others 47 49,1 43,3 43,5 34,3 32,7
Total
First-time job seekers 31,5 43,8 52,2 48,4 42,5 43,6
Job losers/leavers 37,3 20,2 11,3 17,7 35,1 36,6
Others 31,2 36 36,5 33,9 22,4 19,8
Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force, ISTAT.60
Another peculiarity to be noted  is the changing of employment
and unemployment rate during the last 20 years. The total e m-
ployment rate decreases for those aged 15-29, while it increased
for those aged 29-50. This increase is essentially due to the fe-
male employment rate, which has become steadily closer to that of
men. The reason is that the new women cohorts entering the la-
bour market have behaved increasingly like men, remaining in the
labour market. Moreover, we see that the unemployment rate of
young women is higher than that of young men and the phenome-
non is worse in the South. However, as we have said, the main
gender difference between North and South concerns the partici-
pation rates.
With regards to the relation between age and education, uni-
versity degrees clearly give significant advantages on the labour
market. In 1996 graduated accounted for 10,6% of the total em-
ployed but only 6,4% of the unemployed (Tab. 17). The advantage
for graduates has been higher ‘until now’ especially in South
(Mazzotta - Nese, 1997)
5.
Undoubtedly those with upper secondary graduated encounter
more difficulties: 35% of employed but 38,6% of unemployed.
Those with only compulsory schooling (14% of total labour force in
Italy) are still worse off, being 37,6% of the employed and 41% of
unemployed. The probability of being unemployed thus decreases
as the educational level rises. The exceptions are people with only
elementary schooling (having dropped out at 10 years old); i n-
deed, they appear to be favoured as they gravitate around u n-
skilled jobs that most Italian workers now tend to reject. (Tab. 17).
                                                
5. The authors estimate a probability to be employed of graduates in South
145% higher than the national probability.61
TAB. 17 - COMPARISON BETWEEN AGE AND EDUCATION - ITALY - 1996
graduate upper secondary compulsory schooling
% of employed % of unemployed % of employed % of unemployed % of employed % of unemployed
15-19 0,0% 0,0% 20,2% 30,1% 71,6% 63,0%
20-24 1,1% 1,2% 47,4% 56,1% 48,6% 38,4%
25-29 6,7% 13,8% 45,2% 43,1% 44,8% 37,4%
 TOTAL 15-29 4,2% 5,8% 43,4% 47,0% 48,8% 42,0%
30-34 11,3% 12,3% 41,4% 34,3% 43,0% 43,0%
35-39 13,1% 7,3% 39,7% 29,7% 40,0% 45,1%
40-44 14,6% 3,8% 35,1% 19,6% 36,1% 43,7%
45-49 13,2% 1,6% 28,4% 17,2% 31,8% 33,6%
50-54 11,4% 0,0% 23,7% 15,0% 27,0% 26,3%
55-59 10,9% 3,4% 19,8% 8,5% 21,7% 20,3%
60-64 11,5% 0,0% 15,1% 0,0% 18,5% 15,0%
65-69 16,0% 0,0% 13,3% 0,0% 14,9% 0,0%
 TOTAL 15-69 10,6% 6,4% 35,0% 38,6% 37,7% 41,0%
70-74 15,3%  - 13,9%  - 13,9%  -
>74 15,1%  - 17,0%  - 15,1%  -
TOTAL 10,6% 6,4% 34,9% 38,6% 37,6% 41,0%
Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force.
In any event, the figures on education cannot be grasped in
their full significance unless they are adjusted for age. When this
is done we will find that young university or high school graduates
do appear to have greater difficulties in finding job than their less
educated counterparts.
However, the figures need a closer interpretation. For a exam-
ple, among young people aged 20-24, upper secondary graduates
account for 47,4% of employed and 56,1% of unemployed, while,
among people with only compulsory schooling, the employed out-
number the unemployed. Holding a high school diploma thus
seems to hinder the successful search on the labour market.
However, unless the data are corrected along a time limit, they
can be misleading. In fact, a 20-24 years old without a high school
diploma is not advantaged at all. S/he can simply spend more time
finding a suitable job, since leaving school of four or five yeas on
average. Her/his more educated peer, who has probably just en-
tered the labour market, has no time to make the transition from
school to work, a long process, especially in Italy. From this per-
spective, the entry problems of those with better educational quali-
fications are largely scaled down.
Looking at the older aged-groups, the situation is decisively re-62
versed. Among those aged 40-44, people with upper secondary
diploma account for 35,1% of the employed and no more than
18% of the unemployed. The same occurs for university gradu-
ates.
On the whole then, it appears that high school or university
graduates do not greatly shorten their waiting time before entering
into employment; rather those who have a degree and have com-
pleted their transition phase, face a lower risks to remaining un-
employed.
In conclusion it may be said that in Italy young people aged 20-
25 years are the most disadvantaged category on the labour mar-
ket. This is especially the case in the South where, during the ‘80s,
the growth rate of the working age population was twice as high as
in North and where, in spite of these demographic pressures,
there is a structural inability to create jobs.
Moreover, a worrying increase in older unemployed people is
found. The unemployment of older people brings on many social
problems, since being jobless at 22 is not the same as it is at 35.
The reasons for youth unemployment, as we have said, are
manifold. However, it is possible to say that two models, both dis-
tinct and coexistent, are at work (Brunetta, Tronti, 1992), corre-
sponding to two levels of wage equilibrium and, therefore, to two
different segments of the labour market. Firstly a rich urban model
in which easy State aid, the prevalence of the State sector as 'pa-
tron and client', higher school levels and age (25-35), the dodging
of taxes and health insurance payments-all contribute to guaran-
tee a relatively high reservation wage.
As can be seen in Tab. 18 only 14% of unemployed aged 25-29
ask for a wage of 1,000,000 lira while 36.5% ask for more than
1,500,000 lire. In this group unemployment may be caused in part
by the higher reservation wage and in part by the lack of informa-
tion on vacancies and by a low labour demand.63
TAB. 18 - MIMIMUM WAGE ASKED FROM JOB SEEKER, BY AGE - ITALY - 1996
Lire





15 - 24 18.1 52.4 23.6
25 - 29 14.0 45.4 36.4
30 - 39 17.5 42.6 35.4
40 - 49 19.5 40.4 35.0
>49 19.6 38.7 35.7
Source: Quarterly Survey on Labour Force.
Secondly, there is a poor marginal model (people aged 15- 24
or more than 35, urban as well as rural) which has several char-
acteristics such as: a structurally low labour demand, frequent
drop-out from school and generally poor schooling and profes-
sional training, family and social break up, inefficient public serv-
ices, crime and widespread illegal work. These elements cause a
lower acceptance wage and also a lower level of skills. For the
unemployed belonging to this group the problem arises from the
low labour demand and also from the skill mismatch between la-
bour supply and demand.
Furthermore, the almost complete absence of monitoring and of
administrative checks, conditions imposed by these policies, has
reduced the effectiveness of the normative intervention.
What is more, youth unemployment is not equal in the Centre-
North and in the South and requires different solutions. Southern
unemployment is mainly due to the lack of labour demand, caused
by a lack of productive investments, and to a mismatch between
skills supplied - often generic and of low qualification - and skills
demanded.
As will be discussed in the following section, youth unemploy-
ment in South may be alleviated not only by adopting measures of
flexibility in the labour market but also by stimulating investments,
that means: (i) eliminating obstacles such as crime, low productiv-
ity, lack of infrastructures and social and production services, (ii)
improving entreprenuership or self-employment attitude, (iii) pro-64
gramming training functional to the firms’ requirements and to
technological changes. More investments as well as more e m-
ployment should also reduce the reservation wage in the South
whether by the minor costs of moving or by the diversification of
job opportunities that would induce more wage competition.
On the other hand, the problem of unemployment in Centre
North seems to concern mainly skill mismatches. In this case, the
employers demand specialised manual workers, whereas the
workers offer a medium to high, but generic, educational level.
Thus, the labour policy guidelines should be addressed towards
reforming training system.65
PART B: YOUTH EMPLOYMENT POLICIES6667
1.  Introduction
The publication of the European Commission White Paper on
“Growth, Competitiveness and Employment” in 1993, has stirred
up the labour market policy debate in Italy. According to the White
Paper, the Italian labour policy strategy of curbing the increase in
both young and female unemployment and its concentration in the
southern regions has been centred on introducing more flexibility
on the labour market, allowing firms to become more elastic to
technological and organisational changes.
What is more, in the electoral promises of the present Prodi
Government, one of the most urgent commitments was to deal
with the structural features of Italian unemployment. The labour
policy strategy was defined under the “National Labour Agree-
ment”
6 (Accordo per il Lavoro), undertaken with the Trade Unions
and employers representing all production sectors and signed in
September 1996. This Agreement was drawn within the limits of
the special income policy adopted in Italy which is commonly
known as the “Policy of Economic Agreement” (Politica della Con-
certazione Economica).
The main aim of the Agreement is to lower unemployment in It-
aly acting on its structural causes. The features of unemployment
in Italy are in part common to all the countries of the European
Union, as far as it concerns essentially young people, women and
the long term unemployed and is caused by the process of the
transformation of production due to technological innovations. On
the other hand, a typical characteristic of Italian unemployment is
its concentration in the Southern regions of the country
7. In this re-
spect the youth unemployment problem has become a priority in
the general guidelines of labour policy.
Moreover, it is necessary to stress that the points in the Agree-
ment do not only concern specific labour policies, but also the
                                                
6. Henceforth: Agreement.
7. In this respect it may be noted how the Government is concerned with har-
monising the procedures agreed, acting in concert with the rules defined on a
European level and in particular with the European Social Fund priorities.68
general reorganisation of State Administration as well as the ad-
ministrative and bureaucratic procedures to be carried out for the
planning and the execution of public and private investment, and
the revision of the welfare state. Since such objectives involve the
whole of public administration, many government proposals must
also be sought in other legislative measures and/or in Ministerial
decrees, different from the Ministry of Labour, or are at present
being studied on Government Commissions.
The two principal undertakings to borne in mind are: the Bill
(Delega Bassanini) enacting the reform of Public Administration
and the Report of the “Commission for the analysis of the macro-
economic consistency of welfare expenditure” (Commissione
Onofri) instituted by the Head of the ministerial Council.
The Bassanini Bill
The Bassanini Bill pledges the reorganisation of public institu-
tions entrusted with the task of regulating the labour market, elimi-
nating public monopoly in the mediation between labour supply
and demand, and decentralising Employment Agencies.
The Onofri Commission
The Onofri Commission aimed to provide proposals for the re-
form of welfare state expenditure. A basic aspect of such reform
concerns the labour policy expenditure.
An initial problem arises from the relative costs of labour policy
programmes which turn out to be extremely heavy due to the lack
of simultaneous registration in public accounts. This prevents us
from evaluating the economic effectiveness and efficiency of the
majority of these programmes.
The main concern of the Commission is that unemployment
benefits cover only a limited part of the jobless (20% of the total
unemployed). Young people and workers in small firms, who gen-
erally accept voluntary dismissal, are not eligible for benefits. On
the other hand, the reconstruction of data on the expenditures for69
labour policies (see Tab. 19) carried out by the Commission, note
how income compensation measures (that allow people to release
personal income for a limited period from that relatively unstable of
the economic cycle and of employment) range between 0,95%
1.08% as a percentage to the PIL and has been constant, depend-
ing on the economic cycle, during the last ten years. The incentives
for selective employment, which entail a reduction of the labour
costs to encourage the hiring of young people and women, to pro-
mote the development of disadvantaged regions or to reconvert in-
dustrially declining areas, are about 0.84% of the PIL and will de-
crease in the future because of the drastic reduction in social secu-
rity contributions, in concert with the EU. The percentage of active
labour policies, placement and employment services, vocational
programmes, measures improving labour and demand matching,
and enterprise promotion are very low, especially when compared
with the European figures (Baici, Samek Lodovici 1995) (see Tab.
20).
TAB. 19 - LABOUR POLICIES EXPENDITURE
billions % pil
1994 1995 1994 1995
Social shock absorbers
Short-time earnings compensation benefits 4210 3790 0,26 0,21
regular unemployment benefits 7320 6619 0,45 0,38
mobility allowance 3472 2734 0,21 0,15
early retirement 3280 3436 0,20 0,19
total 18282 16579 1,12 0,94
Employment incentives
financial hiring incentives 59 75 0,00 0,00
social security contributions 8142 6565 0,50 0,37
contributions to special job contracts
(trainee contracts, solidarity contracts, ap-
prenticeship etc,) 8599 8242 0,52 0,47
total 16800 14882 1,03 0,84
Active labour policies
Labour Offices* 550 0,03
Vocational training 2250 3100 0,14 0,18
Trainee contracts 1353 1442 0,08 0,08
apprenticeship 1528 1420 0,09 0,08
Social useful jobs* 1170 0,07
total 5131 7682 0,31 0,43
* Data referred to 1996.
Source: Onofri Commission, Final Report.70
TAB. 20 - PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMS IN SOME EU


















United kingdom 0,42 1,05
*1996
Source: OECD - Employment Outlook
The policy proposed by the Commission is, therefore, to move
from a “passive welfare” to a “welfare of opportunities”. That
means re-organising income compensation measures and rising
selective employment measures as well as active labour policies,
especially with regards to vocational training programmes. This
strategy will greatly improve the employment of young people as a
result.
2.  The Labour Policy Strategy
The majority of specific labour market proposals contained in
the Agreement was defined in a Bill (Treu Law, June 1997). We
will review the guidelines of the labour policy followed by the Gov-
ernment and, where provisions are exclusively and/or mainly
aimed at young people, we will give more detailed information.








In order to revitalise employment growth, according to the
scheme defined by the “White Paper on growth, competition and
employment”, the Agreement plans to intervene in industrial policy
and infrastructure. The areas of intervention are:
a) Scientific research. The Treu Law, for example, finances short
term contracts for young researchers at Italian Universities and
subsidises the posting of researchers to small-medium firms;
b) Infrastructure and qualification of public demand in the following
sectors:
•  Public Administration;





The priorities in these fields are:
i)  to reduce administrative and bureaucratic procedures in Public
Administration;
ii)  to overhaul contracting procedures;
iii) to create or to reorganise authorities for checking and pro-
gramming;
iv) to involve private capital in infrastructures and public invest-
ments;
A further aim is to define the priorities for infrastructural build-
ings that can be constructed in either a short or medium term.72
Specific Employment Policies
Specific provisions for employment have primarily of all the
purpose of fostering the creation of small firms and self-
employment. Three of these involve, more or less directly, young
people.
a) Promotion of Youth Self-employment (Prestito d’onore)
The promotion of a youth self-employment scheme is a new
measure defined in the Agreement (and regulated by Decree Law
n. 591, 8 November 1996) aimed at promoting self-employment in
southern Italy.
The scheme was designed by the Società per l’Imprenditoria
Giovanile Spa. (S.I.G.) and is eligible only for the Southern Re-
gions established by the EEC Law n. 2081 of 20 July 1993 (i.e.
Abruzzo until December 1996, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basili-
cata, Calabria, Sicily, Sardinia).
The programme consists of financial incentives and technical
and training assistance to the potential young self-employed per-
son from the drafting of the initial project up to the completion of
training.
The beneficiaries are job seekers registered at the Employment
Office for at least 6 months, living in the South (Objective 1 area,
see above) who are at least 18 years old (with no upper age limit).
Nevertheless, recent data show that 64,2% of applicants are under
30.
An application must be sent to the S.I.G.. This organisation, by
means of a permanent committee of experts, verifies the require-
ments for admission to the programme. The S.I.G. evaluates the
project in the chronological order of application arrival, and
chooses the people to be selected and introduced into a four
month training programme. Then it decides on the expenses to be
covered, the duration of the project and the facilities. In other
words the task of the S.I.G is to finance, nurse, provide technical
tutorial assistance and monitor the projects.
The projects must last at least 5 years and must require no73
more than a 50 million lira contribution (up to 30 million for initial
fixed sunk capital, and up to 20 million for subsidised 5 year credit
with an interest inferior to the interest paid by craft industry).
Benefits cover only the expenses for tangible and intangible
properties, land, buildings and other commodities necessary to
start the project, and also current expenses for the first year (raw
materials, rents and financial charges). While they do not cover
the expenses contracted before the decree of admission to the
programme, and the expenses for the reconstruction of property
and for facilities and wages.
The S.I.G. checks the projects that pass screening, can impose
sanctions and makes a six-monthly report to the Ministero del Bi-
lancio.
The Government provided 30 billion in 1995 and 50 billion in
1996 for the program.
b) Fiscal Incentives (Legge Tremonti)
Another specific measure for employment is the Tremonti Law
[Law 357/1994] which provides tax allowances for young people
or other categories of workers, who wish to be self-employed.
This consists of: a) fiscal incentives for new firms; b) bonuses
for new hiring.
The beneficiaries are: (1) Self-employed workers starting a new
activity who are: (i) under 32 years old; (ii) workers on Wage Sup-
plementation Scheme or entitled to Turnover Benefits (workers
registered on “mobility rolls”) and eligible for early retirement; (iii)
workers registered at the Employment Office for no less than 2
years (i.e. long-term unemployed); (iv) the disabled. (2) Partner-
ships, firms, artisans and professionals that hire first job seekers -
with the requirements described in (1) - under ordinary contracts.
Group (1) is taxed with a lump-sum of 2 million lire in the first
year of activity, 3 million in the second year and 4 million in the
third year that covers corporate tax, personal income tax, local
estate tax, incipient regional tax.
For group (2) there is a “hiring bonus” in the form of a tax al-
lowance of 25% of the worker income subject to with-holding tax.74
According to the  Agreement (not yet approved to date) the
scheme will be modified to provide for: (a) fiscal incentives for new
firms; (b) promoting environmental projects; (c) promoting non-
profit activities.
The beneficiaries will be self-employed workers starting a new
activity that are: (i) under 32 years old; (ii) workers on Wage Sup-
plementation Scheme or entitled to Turnover Benefits; (iii) the dis-
abled.
The benefits would be a tax allowance of a specific (to be de-
fined) percentage of profits, during the initial two years (or 5 years
in Objective 1 areas).
No data of such scheme are available as yet.
c) Financial Incentives for Young Entrepreneurship (Imprenditoria
Giovanile)
This is a measure which has aimed, since 1986 (Law n.
44/1986), at favouring the setting up of new enterprises. Due to its
positive outcome it has been recently reorganised and refinanced
[Law 95/1995] and has become an integral part of Government
strategy.
The scheme was devised by the Società per l’Imprenditoria
Giovanile Spa. (S.I.G.) and eligibility was only for the southern
Regions until 1995. After Law n. 95/1995 eligibility has been ex-
panded to all depressed areas of the country (Objective 1, Objec-
tive 2 and Objective 5B).
It provides financial incentives and technical and training a s-
sistance to the potential young entrepreneurs from the drafting of
the initial project until they are fully trained.
The beneficiaries are production and labour co-operatives and
partnerships founded by young people (aged 18-35), or mainly
consisting of younger people (aged 18-29) (absolute or share-
holder majority), resident in the depressed area.
An application must be sent to the S.I.G that, by means of a
permanent committee of experts, verifies the requirements for the
admission to the programme. Its decision is based on the evalua-
tion of the project and of other documentation sent by the appli-75
cants.
Projects for creating enterprises whether in agriculture, indus-
try, or services are financed. These must be at least 10 years long
and aim to increase production, employment or entrepreneurial
skill. Furthermore, the projects must be new and they should re-
quire an investment up to 5 billion.
Grants are assigned for: (a) initial fixed capital; (b) subsidised
credit; (c) contribution to current expenses for materials, rents and
financial costs; (d) technical assistance; (e) training for young en-
trepreneurs.
Grants cover expenses for new tangible and intangible prop-
erty, lands, buildings and all other commodities for the production
process, while they do not cover expenses for wages and refund-
ing to partners.
The S.I.G. monitors projects that pass the screening and pres-
ents a six-monthly report to the Ministero del Bilancio.
Italian Regions may decide on other provisions. In Campania,
for example, the Regional Law 23 of 1996 gives financial contri-
butions for fixed capital and interests, for the creation of enter-
prises, co-operatives and partnerships mainly run by young peo-
ple (aged 18-35) or by workers owning 2/3 of capital that are on
Turnover or Wage Supplementation Scheme and by young peo-
ple for the rest.
d) Area Contracts (Contratti d’Area)
A new instrument of policy for employment fostered by the
Agreement is the so-called “Area Contracts” ( Contratti d’Area).
The purpose is to favour new production investments in economic
and occupational crisis areas, both with financial incentives and by
bearing upon general costs.
Lower costs may be obtained in the following ways: (i) granting
speed and security in administrative procedures; (ii) establishing
particularly favourable contracts; (iii) improving better credit condi-
tions.
“Area Contracts” consist of two parts: (i) the “Territorial Deal”
(Patto Territoriale), concerning the agreement between unions,76
employers, banks and others, for the fulfilment of the investment
plan; (ii) the “Agreement of Framework Programme”(Accordo di
Programma Quadro) which defines the administrative proce-
dures to be accelerated or modified, the kind of contracts and
wage rules to be applied, agreements on credit conditions and
tax relief.
The “Agreement of Framework Programme” favours also the
hiring of young people.
2.2. Contracts
Atypical Job Contracts
In this field the strategy of the Agreement is to introduce new
forms of job contracts which can make the transition into employ-
ment more flexible.
a) Contract of Rented Work (Lavoro interinale)
A new kind of “atypical” job contract, the “Contract of Rented
Work”, was introduced, and definitively regulated by the Treu Law,
to give flexibility in the hiring of temporary workers.
b) Work-sharing Agreements (contratti di solidarietà) and Part-
time Contracts
“Job Contracts with lower working hours” and “Part-time con-
tracts” facilitate the hiring of young people.
Part-time contracts were initially introduced by Law Decree n.
726, 30 October 1984 and were regulated again by the Treu Law,
to incentive the hiring of young unemployed people by lower
working hours and consequently lower wages
The Government, through collective agreements, can fix limits
such as: (a) ratio of part-time / full-time contracts in the firms; (b)
duties of part-time workers; (c) number of working hours.77
In order to improve part-time contracts, the  Treu Law intro-
duces: (i) a reduction of social security contribution (pension
scheme and wage supplementations) for employers; (ii) further re-
ductions for:
•  young first job-seekers living in the South (Objective 1 areas);
•  re-entrant women;
•  older people in gradual retirement;
and (iii) the extension of this contract to the primary sector (Agri-
culture).
Summing up, the Treu Law should encourage temporary con-
tracts through different percentages of social contribution by dif-
ferentiating working hours (24, 32, 36, 40) and favouring the
shorter.
Mixed Cause Contracts
the Agreement and Treu Law reviewed job contracts which ex-
plicitly favour youth employment: “Youth Training Contracts”
(Contratti Formazione Lavoro) for which the established term was
extended, and “Apprenticeship Contracts” that was substantially
reformulated.
They are also defined as “mixed cause contracts” because of
the vocational training content of the contract.
a) Youth Training Contracts (YTCs)
This type of contract was already considered by Law n.
285/1977, introduced again experimentally in 1983, by Law n. 79,
art. 8, and finally established in art. 3, of the Law n. 863, 1984,
with more attention to the training content of the projects.
The general scheme is basically decided by the Government
together with the Ministry of Labour. The YTC works all over the
country, however some further advantages, in terms of social se-
curity contributions, are provided for Southern Italy, for some ar-
eas in recession in the North and Centre and for firms in craft in-
dustry. The organisation of the training scheme can be designed78
at Regional level by the Trade Unions, employers and the R e-
gions. Projects including training terms and details can be pro-
posed also by each single firm eligible for YTCs. If there are no lo-
cal agreements, national conditions will operate.
The design of the scheme is: (a) to encourage the hiring of
young unemployed people by lowering labour costs for employers
(b) to offer the firm the opportunity to decide to keep the workers
after having tested their skills during the training; (c) to increase
trainees’ chances of employment through work experience and the
acquisition of an intermediate or a high skill level.
The beneficiaries are young unemployed people (the age limit
was put up from 29 to 32, in 1994).
An employer can submit a training project for approval to a Re-
gional Employment Commission. No approval is required if the
project is in accordance with national level agreements. In this
case the employer must send an application to the Employment
Agency and after 20 days s/he can directly hire at the Local La-
bour and Employment Office ( Ufficio Provinciale del Lavoro),
making a declaration promising to observe all the conditions
stated.
There are two types of YTCs: (a) 24-month long training con-
tracts (a duration of 36 months can be established only for r e-
search contracts and contracts drawn with refugees); (b) 12-month
basic training contracts.
Both of them provide a reduction in the Social Contribution
charged to the employer and a wage level lower than that of work-
ers with ordinary contracts for the same job. The main difference
is that in type (b) YTC the employer will reap benefits only after 12
months and only if s/he transforms the YTC into an ordinary con-
tract.
Moreover, the YTCs must provide some hours of training: in
type (a) YTC no less than 80 hours for medium professional level
and at least 130 hours for upper professional level; in type (b) no
less than 20 hours. According to EEC rules, it is possible to apply
for financing of the training projects.
Private and public firms and associations who can stipulate
YTCs are: Industry firms, Farmers, Traders, Craft industry, Asso-
ciations (professional, sporting, cultural), Foundations, Employers79
on a professional register, Pools of firms.
The firms must not have laid off workers for the same job
during the last 12 months preceding the YTC request. Further-
more, only employers who have transformed into ordinary con-
tracts at least 60% of YTCs - excluding those who voluntary dis-
missed or were justifiably fired - can use this procedure for new
hiring.
The training is normally ‘on the job’ and at the end of the term
of contract the employer must report on the professional qualifica-
tion the worker attained.
According to the Treu Law, a longer duration (three years) of
benefits will be allowed only if the employer transforms the YTC
into an ordinary contract.
The exemptions are different for regions and sectors, and par-
ticularly:
1) tax subsidies reduced by 25% for employers not operating in
the South;
2) For small firms (up to 15 employees) in trade and tourism the
exemption is 40%;
3) For artisans and employers operating in the South or in d e-
pressed areas, the subsidies have been adjusted to that of the
apprenticeship (a fixed social contribution of 4875 lire per
week);
4) For Associations and Foundations the reduction is of 25% -50%
if operating in Southern Italy.
In short, if we consider a reduction of 25% in tax subsidies and
a standard wage paid in the industry sector, the employers can
save about 4,5 million lire per year for each worker employed on a
YTC.
b) Apprenticeship
The apprenticeship contract was introduced for the first time in
1955 (L. 25/1955 and art. 21 of L. 56/1987).
This contract was drawn up at national level by the Govern-
ment. The beneficiaries are young people aged 14-20 (up to 29 for
highly skilled jobs for firms in the craft industry). According to the80
Treu Law, the age limit should be put up from 14-20 years to 16-
24 (up to 26 years in the South).
Firms that want to stipulate apprenticeship contracts must apply
for authorisation to the Local Labour and Employment Office
which checks various technical and organisational requirements
(such as the number of workers in the firms, number of appren-
tices hired and to be hired, etc.).
The direct effect of the apprenticeship is to give a professional
qualification to young unemployed people through work and train-
ing periods. Mostly, training is ‘on the job’, but the collective
agreement may introduce some additional hours (about 100 hours
per year) of ‘out of job’ training. The additional training is organ-
ised by the Regions. Production and office workers can be hired
on an apprenticeship contract, but the medical sector, as well as,
those tasks, that are too simple to require any training, are ex-
cluded.
The apprenticeship is favourable to artisans. In fact, after
authorisation, they can directly hire the young apprentices, without
applying to the Labour and Employment Office.
The duration of the apprenticeship is variable but must not
cover more than 5 years. Working hours can vary too: from 35 to
44 hours per week, for different aged workers, favouring the
younger.
There are two advantages for the employer: a reduction both in
wage and social contributions. Wages are decided in the collective
bargaining agreements or, failing this, through apprentice and em-
ployer agreement. In the latter, wages can not be much lower than
those stated by industrial collective agreements. The social contri-
bution is fixed at 4.841 lire or 5.021 lire per week comprehensive
of job accident insurance. Artisans pay only for maternity contribu-
tions.
New features introduced by the Treu Law are:
The apprenticeship should give a more professional qualifica-
tion to young unemployed people, being extended to all economic
sectors, including agriculture, and should be more favourable to
the artisans.
The duration of the apprenticeship contract is variable but must
not cover less than 18 months and more than 4 years.81
The apprenticeship contract should be divided into three parts:
(1) a variable period in ‘off the job training’; (2) a period during
which the young person is mainly engaged in work by the firms
and takes some training off and on the job; (3) a final period for
checking the professional qualification attained.
During the whole period of contract the wage should be paid by
the employer, at the end s/he should be refunded for expenses
entailed during the out of job training.
Wage Bargaining
At present the labour policy debate in Italy is essentially centred
on wage bargaining.
An instrument used for many years in order to favour employ-
ment in Southern regions was the “Exemption From Social Secu-
rity Contributions” (Fiscalizzazione degli oneri sociali) which aimed
to reduce the fiscal wedge between the wage paid to the employ-
ees and that paid by the employers. Since 1996, following the
agreement with the European Community such exemption has
been reduced, and will be progressively eliminated, and thus the
problem of finding other ways of reducing labour costs in these re-
gions remains.
On this point the Agreement provides for: (1) particular forms of
contracting with “temporary” (for a period of about one year) total
or partial fiscal reductions, for job contracts carried out in the
“Agreement of Framework Programme” within the “Territorial Deal”
or in the European Social Fund objective areas; (2) a reduction of
contributions regarding health insurance; (3) tax relief for the non-
profit sector, for new production activities run by young people and
for newly hired people, especially if young.
Moreover, the Treu Law has codified the Emergence Contracts
(Contratti di gradualità) which aim at bringing workers in the “black
economy” into regular employment. In fact, firms which favour the
progressive bringing up to the regular wage can apply wage con-
tracts set for newly hired employees to their workers.82
2.3. Supply Labour Policies
The general themes discussed in Italy regarding the supply la-
bour policy are:
1. How to improve “Human Capital” through the reform of the
educational and vocational system.
2. The reform of unemployment subsides through the reorganisa-
tion of “Unemployment Benefits” and “Turnover or Mobility
Rolls” (Liste di Mobilità), that means transferring the subsidies
for employment into subsidies for unemployment.
3. The reform of the welfare state also through defining subsidies
for the unemployed with no previous work experience,
“Guaranteed Minimum Wage” (salario minimo garantito).
4. Within the scope of the Agreement (and of the Treu Law), great
importance is also given to some forms of “active labour poli-
cies”, mainly aimed at young people, which encourage the
adoption of workfare policies rather than of welfare policies,
such as “Socially Useful Activities” ( Lavori Socialmente Utili)
and “work experience in firms”.
a) Vocational Training in Italy
The reordering of professional training is a priority in the
Agreement, and in the Treu Law general guidelines are fixed. The
reform of the Italian Training Scheme at present provides for: (i)
the revision of the whole school system: High School, Training and
University; (ii) the development of new forms of exploitation of hu-
man capital following the introduction of new technologies as: “on
the job training” (within the firm) and “permanent training” (training
carried out during the whole of working life and improved by con-
tracts providing for sabbatical years, leave to undertake training
programmes, etc.); (iii) a better co-operation between institutions
which manage the training; (iv) the development of counselling; (v)
the promotion of work experience and “on the job” training for
people leaving school, improving their access to the labour mar-
ket.
The structure of Italian vocational training was laid out by Law83
n. 845, of 21 December 1978 (said Legge Quadro) and by Art. 123
of EEC Constitutional Law.
Regions determine projects for vocational guidance and train-
ing of the job seekers. The European Social Fund (ESF) finances
the training of disadvantaged categories. The Ministry of Labour
has a link role with the ESF. It passes the project to the ESF and
gives its own technical and financial support.
Regions plan the training activities at a regional level with an-
nual or medium term programmes. Beneficiaries are Italian citi-
zens who have the minimum legal level of education and non-
Italian citizens according to international agreements.
Training projects are run directly by Regional Training Centres
or through entrepreneurial organisations, social associations and
pools. Private citizens must have some characteristics checked by
the Region. Moreover, they are free from taxation.
During training, trainees have an insurance for pension and
sickness schemes. Courses consist of one or more cycles (up to a
maximum of 4) and cover no more than 600 hours. At the end of
the course an official certificate detailing the professional qualifi-
cation achieved by the trainee will be given.
As in the Youth Training Contract, employers, hiring a young
person who has followed a training programme, pay the same so-
cial security contribution for the first six months of work as for ap-
prentices.
According to the art. 123 of EEC Constitutional Law, the Euro-
pean Social Fund has the following aims: (i) to fight long-term un-
employment and to promote the hiring of both young people and
also other disadvantaged categories (objective 3); (ii) to favour the
updating of workers’ professional qualifications, according to the
evolution of the cycle of production; (iii) to promote the develop-
ment of regions in recession (objective 1); (iv) to promote indus-
trial reorganisation in regions and sub-regions in decline (objective
2); (v) to promote rural development (objective 5b).
The ESF finances all the activities useful for the aims above,
therefore it provides training for job seekers, promotes employ-
ment, initial and permanent training and counselling, improves
human capital, the R&D, the qualification of trainers and acts as a
link between the training centre and firms.84
The expenses covered are: (a) wages, travel and residence; (b)
training, organisation and evaluation costs; (c)expenses for i m-
proving hiring.
The Ministry for Labour presents the projects to the EEC
Commission, the ESF co-finances the activity programme and
gives subsidies and supplies technical assistance to pilot proj-
ects.
b) Work Access and Training Programme for Young People
According to art. 15 Law n. 451/1994, the Government, with the
Ministry of Labour, consulting Regional Administrations and R e-
gional Employment Commissions, should implement projects to
improve the access of young workers to the labour market, in ar-
eas in crisis established by Law n. 236/93.
The beneficiaries are young people (aged 19-32, put up to 35
for the long-term unemployed) registered at the Labour and Em-
ployment Offices.
The access projects should be: (i) socially useful activities; (ii)
schooling programmes, basic level vocational training for people
with compulsory school qualifications and vocational training of the
second level for people with a high school diploma; (iii) ‘on the job’
training and work experience dealing with Associations of Employ-
ers (also professional).
The programme cannot last more than 12 months and cannot
involve workers for more than 80 hours per month. During the
programme the young worker remains registered at the E m-
ployment Office or on the Turnover Register, and maintains the
right to Turnover Benefits and Wage Supplementation Scheme
(WSS).
The number of workers included in the programme of type (iii)
depends on the number of employees already in the firm or the
number of hiring the firm makes. At the end of the training pro-
gramme, the employer can hire the young trainee under a Youth
Training Contract.
During the programme the young trainee earns 7.500 Italian lira
per hour. The Employer covers ½ of this sum, but only for working85
hours and not for training hours.
The programme is financed by a National Fund for the Reduc-
tion of Unemployment stated by Law 236/93, which lasts until
1998. The Regions can give additional financial contribution for the
programme in their own area. Such a supplement exists in Cam-
pania, according to the Regional Law 15/1993.
c) Special Programme for Young Unemployed people in the South
of Italy
The Treu Law provides an extra two years funding of 1,000 bil-
lion Lira for projects of Socially Useful Activities and scholarships
for work experience for 100,000 young people living in areas with
high unemployment.
The beneficiaries are young people aged 19-32 (put up to 35
for the long-term unemployed - more than 30 months - registered
at the Labour and Employment Office). Projects cannot last more
than 12 months and cannot involve workers for more than 80
hours per month. During the programme the young worker r e-
mains registered at the Employment Office.
Contributions to young people are the same as the above Work
Access and Training Programme.
d) Socially Useful Activities (SUA)
The Law n. 608/1996 and the Treu Law dictate the Socially
Useful Activities programmes.
Local Authorities, Public Administrative Offices, Companies
with prevailing public share, Social Co-operatives and other indi-
viduals established by the Ministry of Labour devise the scheme.
Technical assistance by the Regional Employment Commissions
is provided. It is eligible for all parts of the Country, and its aim is
to favour employment improving socially useful activities.
The projects can be national, regional and for areas which can
include more than one region.
For national and inter-regional projects, it must be submitted to86
the Ministry of Labour and accepted by the Central Employment
Commission, which decide on the basis of an Evaluation Com-
mission. Regional projects must be submitted to Employment
Agencies and approved by the Regional Employment Commis-
sion.
Beneficiaries are: (a) workers enrolled on the Turnover Register
or Mobility Rolls; (b) workers on the Wage Supplementation
Scheme; (c) young people aged 19-32 (put up to 35 for the long-
term registered unemployed).
The programme cannot last more than the duration of Mobility
or Turnover benefits or Wage supplementation scheme. During
the programme the young workers are still registered as unem-
ployed, or are on the Mobility Roll, and keep the right to Turnover
Benefits and the Wage Supplementation Scheme.
During the programme the worker earns a bonus of 10% of the
benefits already claimed, if s/he is not on benefit at the time, pay-
ment will be of 7.500 Italian lira per hour.
The programme is financed by a National Fund for the reduc-
tion of Unemployment established by Law 236/93, which lasts until
1998, and with a financial contribution of the individual who has
proposed the project. The Regions can give an additional financial
contribution for the programme in their own area. Such a supple-
ment operates at present in Campania (according to the Regional
Law 15/1993).
2.4. Institutions
One of the most important objectives of the Agreement, con-
cerns the reform of “Employment Agencies”:
The Employment Agencies with the loss of the public monopoly
of the labour placement system and in view of the reform of em-
ployment services should: (i) develop the supply of labour services
to both workers and firms; (ii) develop the counselling and the
planning of training programmes.
A regional decentralisation of Employment Agencies is to be
provided to improve local labour markets. Indeed, as set by the
Bassanini Bill, every Region is adopting a Law providing a reor-87
ganisation of employment services and labour policies at a re-
gional level. The involvement of private capital and social institu-
tions will be stimulated and the role of public intervention will be
that of regulation, inspection and programming labour services.
3.  How to evaluate the Labour Policy Strategy
As shown above, in the nineties in Italy, as well as all other in-
dustrialised countries, strong labour policy strategies have been
formulated to contrast the high levels of structural unemployment.
These included, inter alia, improving employment opportunities of
young people living in the southern regions and encouraging a
more flexible organisation of work. The following Summary
Scheme sums up the policies which involve young people both di-
rectly and/or indirectly.
A further and more fruitful task, now, is to try to evaluate
these policies. This process generally focused on the evaluation
of the impact on the labour market, that is, to assess the pro-
gramme goals of an individual policy instrument with a measur-
able outcome through an impact or cost-benefit analysis. This
type of evaluation needs detailed data sets collected from moni-
toring procedures, that reveal whether the programme design
and the implementation of policies correspond to policy goals,
and it also requires checking mechanisms that show whether the
implementation of policies is managed efficiently. In Italy, unfor-
tunately, this process of policy evaluation is rarely implemented,
with only a few exceptions. (Borzaga, Brunello 1997, Felli, Ichino
1988). The first reason is that the majority of policies (mainly ac-
tive labour policies) are too recent or have not yet been imple-
mented. However, the main reason is that there no longer exists
any system of monitoring or checking of policies. The methodol-
ogy of evaluation used is merely based on case studies and ver-
bal interpretation of legal documents at a descriptive level, the
reports have been made with poor data sets or dealt with from a
methodological point of view. (Sameck Ludovici 1995, Martini,
Garibaldi 1993).
The way we will attempt to evaluate the policies is to privilege88
the other two aspects of policy evaluation, generally not often
analysed, policy formation process and implementation. The
methodology used is a “target-oriented evaluation” (Schmid,
O’Reilly, Schomann, 1996) that is, acknowledging that policy for-
mation and implementation are interrelated processes and e m-
bedded in a historically specific socio-economic context. In this re-
spect the recent labour policy strategies in Italy can be evaluated
primarily by analysing the institutional changes in industrial rela-
tions and in the welfare state, assessing to what degree social
groups are involved in accepting and pursuing the principal aims
of labour policy programmes.
The issue of debate on welfare state reform and on wage bar-
gaining is to introduce more flexibility guaranteeing workers or the
unemployed with a high chance of finding employment.
The industrial relations and welfare system in the last twenty
years has been too rigid; the former favoured “strong workers”, i.e.
30-50 year old men employed in medium or large industries, with
rigidities in hiring and firing as well as with an automatic wage in-
dexation mechanism. The welfare system brought about an i n-
come redistribution favouring household incomes, and unemploy-
ment benefits, were provided only for dismissed or on turnover
and/or on mobility roll workers.
By the end of the eighties the system encountered serious diffi-
culties. More internal and in-out firm flexibility has thus been pur-
sued in industrial relations, for example new atypical job contracts
were introduced (part-time contracts, work-sharing agreements,
contracts of rented work, youth training contracts, apprenticeship
contracts), the wage supplementation scheme, collective dismiss-
als and subsidies to the unemployed (unemployment benefits,
turnover or mobility roll) were reformed.
Important changes were also introduced in collective bargaining
agreements. From a “mixed” bargaining system, in which the wage
structure was formally defined at a central level but in effect at an
industrial level, the new system, established in July 1993, devel-
oped a two tier system. The national industry level contracts set
the structure and evolution of wages (over a two years period),
“consistently” within official inflation targets, as well as working
conditions (with a four year limit). On the other hand a de-89
centralised bargaining system, mostly at large firm level, was pro-
vided for strengthening the flexibility of wages according to the
firms’ performance. A further evolution of bargaining decentralisa-
tion was the introduction of Area Contracts that, in promoting
agreements between employers and unions at local level to insti-
tute advantageous conditions for new investment or for the expan-
sion of existing businesses and for maximisation of the job impact,
represent a new form of “regional” decentralisation of the bar-
gaining system.
As can be seen above, regarding the labour market, the ob-
jective of Welfare State reform is to reorganise unemployment
benefits, moving from a “passive welfare” to a “welfare of o p-
portunities” with a central role of active labour policies, but in a
budgetary framework constraint that does not cover extra costs.
In conclusion, the labour policy strategy is aimed at strength-
ening flexibility in industrial relations along with social solidarity to-
wards jobless people. The question is: does that strategy really
affect the young? Are the single implemented programs sufficient
and/or efficient in achieving the aim of increasing employment for
the young?
The answer to the first question is affirmative. The employ-
ment policies as well as the new contract programmes give new
tools to the social agents in decentralised agreement bargaining
and counteract the rigidity of access to the labour market of
young people. The active labour policies addressed to young
people, on the other hand, aim to provide a first job opportunity
or training.
The answer to the latter is more complicated but generally
negative. We will now proceed with an analysis of each single
policy.Summary Scheme of Youth Labour Policies












Job seekers registered in the
Official Job Agencies for no
less than six months living in
the South (objective 1 area,
and by 1998 also in the other
areas with high unemployment
problems), over 18 and without
upper limits (in any case 65%
of proponents are aged below
29)
Financial contribution of no
more than 50 milion Liras (up
to 30 milion L. for initial fixed
sunk capital, up to20 milion L.
for subsided 5 years credit
The Società per l'Imprenditoria
Giovanile S.p.A. has the re-
sponsibility for evaluating the
projects, financing, measuring
and providing technical assis-
tence





















Fiscal Incentives a) Youths aged below 32 years
b) Workers on Wage-
compensation Scheme or enti-
tled to Tournover Benefits, or
eligible to Early Retirement.
c) Unemployed in the job
queue from no less than 2
years
d) disables
a) lump-sum reduced tax for
self- employed starting a new
activity and characterized by
eligibility
b) tax allowance of 25% of
worker wage for partnerships,
firms, artisans and profession-
als that hire job-seekers char-
acterized by eligibility










Youths aged 18-35 Financial contribution to initial
fixed capital, to credit, to cur-
rent expenses, for no more
than 5 billion Liras, for parten-
erships or cooperatives or
composed or mainly composed
of youths characterized by
eligibility
The Sociatà per l'Imprenditoria
Giovanile S.p.A. has the re-
sponsibility for evaluating the
projects, financing, providing
technical assistance and for

















2. Contracts for flexibility
Work-sharing Agree-




living in South (Obj. 1 area)
Re-entrant workers Elders in
gradual retirement





lish limits to applications of
these contracts














a) Youths Training Con-
tracts (Contratti di For-
mazione Lavoro)
Youths aged up to 29 (32 from
1994)
Reduction of social security
contribution (differently form
sectors, regions and firmrs) for
employers
Collective agreements define
the training scheme and Re-
gional Employment Commis-











b) Apprenticeship Youths aged 14-20 (29 Years
for special cases) 16-24 by
Treu Law (up 26 years in South
Regions)
reduction of social contributions
and of wage for employers
(artisans are favoured)














a) Social Useful Activi-
ties
b) Training Programs
c) "out the job" training
and professional work
experience (stages)
Youths aged 19-32 (up 35
years for long-term unem-
ployed -enrolled for 2 years in
the Official Job Agencies) living
in high unemployment areas
Contribution of 7500 Liras per
hour (max 80 h per mounth).
The working hours are covered
1/2 by employers and the other
half, plus the training hours, by
National Found for the Reduc-
tion of Unemployment
Ministry of Labour, Regional
Administrations, Regional Em-
ployment Commission




a) Public Utility Jobs
b) Scholarships for
stages and "on the job"
training
Youths aged 19-32 (up 35
years for long-term unem-
ployed -enrolled on the Official
Job Agencies for 30 mounths)
living in areas with high unem-
ployment
Contribution of 7500 Liras per
hour (max 80 h per mounth)
Ministry of Labour, Regional
Administrations, Regional Em-
ployment Commission











Social Useful Actvities a) Workers enrolled in Tourn-
over Register
b) Workers in wage Supple-
mantation Scheme
c) Youths aged 19-32 or up to
35 years for the long-term un-
employed
Contribution of 7500 Liras per
hour (max 80 h per mounth)
Ministry of Labour approves
national projects. Regional
Employment Commission ap-
proves local projects. Projects
are made from private, public






















The “Promotion of Youth Self-employment” and the “Financial
Incentives for Youth Entrepreneurship” aim to increase job op-
portunities by giving financial incentives to the new activities - as
partnership or self-employment -.
The former program is still at an early stage and only the ini-
tial training courses for proponents of approved projects have
been carried out as yet. If we refer to the first 25000 applications
before the end of May 1997 we see (Tab. 21) that 14,6% of the
applications examined (and 8,4% of total applications presented)
were passed and applicants admitted to training courses. The
region with the highest number of applications is Campania
(30,1%). Of total applications presented 64,2% of applicants
were under 30 (58,5% of total successful applications), 70% on
average are male.
TAB. 21 - PROMOTION OF YOUTH SELF-EMPLOYMENT (LAW 591/96)
BY REGION OF RESIDENCE OF PROPONENTS
PROJECTS
TOTAL PASSED REJECTED UNDER EXAM.
REGIONS
a b c d b/a*100
(b/(a-
d))*100
ABRUZZO 1457 133 711 613 9,1 15,8
MOLISE 330 28 178 124 8,5 13,6
CAMPANIA 6455 622 3479 2354 9,6 15,2
PUGLIA 4746 469 2399 1878 9,9 16,4
BASILICATA 910 71 452 387 7,8 13,6
CALABRIA 4130 309 1979 1842 7,5 13,5
SICILIA 4692 339 2018 2345 7,2 14,4
SARDEGNA 1905 104 873 928 5,5 10,6
TOTALE 24625 2065 12089 10471 8,4 14,6
collected data at 31 May 1997.
Source: Società per l'Imprenditoria Giovanile.
The second program has been implemented for over ten
years. Until the end of January 1997 (see Tab. 22) 4900 projects93
had BEEN presented and 1162 projects passed the screening of
the Commission, corresponding to 3316million Lira of investment
and to 22234 new employed people. In this respect, research
(Croce 1997b) shows how this Law in the starting-up phase has
had a significant effect on employment. Regions with the highest
number of approved projects are Campania, Apulia and Calabria
(respectively 267, 143 and 136 out of 1083 projects approved
until the 1
st of July 1996), while sectors with the highest number
of projects submitted are Farming and Livestock (23,5% of 4609
projects submitted until the 1
st of July 1996) in Agriculture (28,2),
Basic Food Processing (6%) in Industry (51,1%) and Business
Services (17,2) in Services (20,7%).
The form of both programmes covers two main areas: the
former regards the nursing phase and consists of training
courses and technical assistance. In this phase the aim is to
promote self-employment or an entrepreneurial job attitude and,
in this way, to eliminate a rigid element of work access which lies
in the young’s attitude towards stable jobs.
The latter regards the financial incentives to sunk capital and
credit. In this case research on the Youth Entrepreneurship Law
(Scandizzo, Atella 1997; Croce; Battistin, Gavosto, Rettore 1997)
has shown that these incentives have created lower risk firms
but with average performances inferior to that of firms without in-
centives. As regards the debt cost, this means that the minor
long term cost of funding is more than offset by the higher level
of the short term cost of funding. This makes a firm’s position
more precarious when the incentives run out. In fact, it has been
proved that the survival function, depending on the economic ef-
ficiency of the firm, has rates generally higher than spontaneous
firms when incentives to the starting up are running, but a lesser
rate when they end.94
TAB. 22 - YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP (LAW 44/83):
SITUATION TO 23 JANUARY 1997
1. projects submitted - accepted and financed
accepted 1162
rejected 3124
not eligible for subsidies 409
not definitive 44
total projects passed 4739
institutet 7
to be proceeded 118
to be completed 25
total projects submitted 4889 (a)
2. projects accepted




3. Projects eligible for subsidies
number of projects 923
financial commitment 3109
4. Firms financed
number of firms 784
funds distributed 1831
a) Including 31 projects submitted under Law 236/1993.
b) Incuding 9 projects accepted under Law 236/1993.
Source: Società per l'Imprenditoria Giovanile S.p.A..95
Contracts
The objective of the new types of work contract is to improve
the flexibility of the firms in labour force management, within the
scope of technological change and of competitiveness recovery,
as well as to favour labour demand for jobless people.
Part-time contracts and solidarity contracts promote the internal
flexibility of firms. They permit work sharing hours between a
higher number of workers, and in this way increase employment.
As we have said in part A, these contracts have been running in
Italy since 1984 but with little success. The lack of part-time em-
ployment contracts has been considered one of the structural
problems of the Italian labour market while in other European
countries, such as Holland, it has been a strategic tool in fighting
unemployment by inducing a generation change of the labour
force and favouring young and female employment.
The Italian case can be viewed as an example of an inade-
quacy between single programmes and the policy formation proc-
ess. In fact, the development of part-time contracts must be strictly
linked to a more general strategy of working time regulation in in-
dustrial organisation.
Mixed cause contracts such as Apprenticeship contracts and
Youth Training Contracts affect the degree of freedom the firms
have in the management of the labour force. The implicit assump-
tion is that more flexibility in hiring and firing and more incentives
towards youth employment may increase the firms bias in favour
of employing workers.
These contracts have been running successfully since 1984.
From 1990 to 1996, 3.3million apprenticeship contracts were
drawn up (see Tab. 23), an average of 470,000 contracts per year,
20% of them in the South (but only 16% in the last year). 35-40%
of contracts regard female workers and the main sectors employ-
ing female apprentices are Clothing, Furnishing and Commerce,
Tourism, Hotels and Public Exercises, while sectors employing
mainly male apprentices are the Mechanical and Construction
sectors.96
TAB. 23 - HIRING UNDER APPRENTICESHIP: 1990-1996
Apprentices % by Regions Var. on previous Year
Years
Total Artisans Total Artisans Total Artisans
South
1990 117582 73249 22,2 21,8
1991 115882 72108 22,1 21,7 -1,4 -1,4
1992 109282 69858 21,6 21,9 -5,7 -3,1
1993 91044 55469 20,2 20,1 -16,7 -20,6
1994 76336 47150 17,9 17,8 -16,2 -15,0
1995 75333 46115 18,0 18,2 -1,3 -2,2
1996 66290 39345 16,0 16,4 -12,0 -14,7
Centre-North
1990 412159 262635 77,8 78,2
1991 407885 260668 77,9 78,3 -1,0 -0,7
1992 396452 249469 78,4 78,1 -2,8 -4,3
1993 358721 220238 79,8 79,9 -9,5 -11,7
1994 350399 217207 82,1 82,2 -2,3 -1,4
1995 342900 206988 82,0 81,8 -2,1 -4,7
1996 347602 200587 84,0 83,6 1,4 -3,1
Italy
1990 529741 335884 100 100
1991 523767 332776 100 100 -1,1 -0,9
1992 505734 319327 100 100 -3,4 -4,0
1993 449765 275707 100 100 -11,1 -13,7
1994 426735 264357 100 100 -5,1 -4,1
1995 418233 253103 100 100 -2,0 -4,3
1996 413892 239932 100 100 -1,0 -5,2
Source: Relazione Generale sulla Situazione Economica del Paese.97
Since 1984, 4.7million young people were hired on a Youth
Training Contract (see Tab. 24), an average of 400,000 contracts
per year. In the eighties, 9% of contracts on average were drawn
up in the South while in the nineties this percentage has doubled
all over the southern Regions (see Graph 24). A quarter of con-
tracts regard female workers and the majority of them are people
aged 19-24 (see Tab. 25). Nevertheless the average age has
been growing recently because, as we have seen, the new rules
also apply to older people. The typical young person on a training
contract has been hired by a small industrial firm and is a manual
worker (see Tab. 25).
These contracts have a two tier advantage: (a) benefits for the
firm by lowering labour costs and providing hiring flexibility, (b)
training for the young workers. Research in the eighties noted that
the role of training provision for the young worker did not appear to
be crucial. In large part the training content of the contract was
modest, reduced in time and poor in quality - mainly “on the job”
training (ISFOL 1988).
The question is, if the benefits for the firm have had any posi-
tive effect on youth employment. There are many doubts as to
whether to consider these new forms of contracts functional to the
young person’s participation on the labour market or whether they
have rather been a convenient tool for more flexible labour organi-
sation for the firms.
Other research points out that the net effect has been positive
but limited while the displacement effect, when the young
squeezed out workers already employed, had prevailed (Bruno,
Arrigo, Guarna 1987, Venturini 1997). Another element that justi-
fies the functional use of this contract by the firm is the progres-
sive increase in the age limit that in some regional agreements
has been fixed up to 45 years old.
On the other hand, data show the strong cyclical effects of YTC
implementation. In fact, Training Contracts improve pro-cyclically
in the phase of economic growth, and, in spite of the greater
benefits in the southern regions, in more dynamic areas of the
North-Centre. While at the beginning of the nineties, years of high
unemployment, the reduction in Training Contracts was greater
than the reduction of youth employment, particularly in Northern98
regions (see Croce 1997a).
The pro-cyclical use of YTC can be explained through the la-
bour hoarding strategy of the firms. In fact, these can exploit the
YTC, which have lower adjustment costs than other contracts, by
achieving more in-out flexibility. From the insider-outsider theory,
we can consider youth as new entrants who, when labour demand
grows, are hired on a YTC as long as benefits cover hiring costs.
After a demand crisis, such as that in 1991-93 in Italy, they are
easily the first to be fired because these contracts are more flexi-
ble than regular ones. Those employed on a regular contract will
be fired only if the crisis persists over time.
Supply labour policies
Supply labour policies aim to reduce unemployment by lowering
skill mismatch, inducing choice and behaviour supply models that
are homogeneous to labour demand and by safeguarding human
capital from the long-term persistence of unemployment.
In the “Extraordinary European Council Meeting on Employ-
ment” (Luxembourg 20-21 November 1997), European countries
agreed on the guidelines of supply labour policy concerning edu-
cational and vocational training system reform. As we have seen,
the Italian vocational system bears a lot of structural problems
mainly due to on the over-rigidity of mixed, public and private, or-
ganisation and on its marginal role compared with the educational
system. In fact, 2.5million students attend secondary school but
only 300,000 young people on average go on training courses
(see Tab. 26) -35% go on post-diploma training courses the others
on post-compulsory school training courses -. However, the main
structural problem concerns the local authorities - particularly in
the southern Regions - that are unable to channel and thus spend
EU funding. In fact, as can be seen in Tab. 27, only 17,7% of EU
funds have been effectively spent in the South.99
TAB. 24 - HIRING UNDER TRAINEE CONTRACTS (LAW 863/1984, ART. 3), 1984-1995
WORKED HIRED Var. on previous Year
South C - N Italy South C - N Italy
% South
1985 7.445 100.989 108.434 6,9
1986 18.152 211.083 229.235 143,8 109,0 111,4 7,9
1987 33.312 369.544 402.856 83,5 75,1 75,7 8,3
1988 44.473 449.170 493.643 33,5 21,5 22,5 9,0
1989 55.043 475.056 530.099 23,8 5,8 7,4 10,4
1990 68.314 420.789 489.103 24,1 -11,4 -7,7 14,0
1991 64.952 251.391 316.343 -4,9 -40,3 -35,3 20,5
1992 55.838 199.877 255.715 -14,0 -20,5 -19,2 21,8
1993 44.036 144.916 188.952 -21,1 -27,5 -26,1 23,3
1994 43.579 177.537 221.116 -1,0 22,5 17,0 19,7
1995 46.610 204.210 250.820 7,0 15,0 13,4 18,6
1996 54.430 214.790 269.220 16,8 5,2 7,3 20,2
Source: Ministero del lavoro - Osservatorio sul mercato del Lavoro.
GRAPH. 24 - HIRING UNDER TRAINING CONTRACT BY REGIONS, 1985-1996











1985 1996TAB. 25. HIRING UNDER TRAINEE CONTRACTS (LAW 863/1984, ART. 3), 1984-1995
PERC. BY CHARACTERISTICS
Worked hired Age Education Sector Firm size









1984 68,4 31,6 16,4 64,7 18,9 67,7 31,3 1,0 0,3 67,8 31,9 50,5 29,4 10,1 10,0
1985 60,0 40,0 13,1 68,5 18,4 62,4 35,9 1,6 0,4 60,7 38,9 67,4 19,8 4,8 5,2
1986 58,3 41,7 13,4 67,5 19,0 62,3 35,2 1,9 0,5 61,2 38,3 71,9 18,5 5,1 4,4
1987 60,0 40,0 12,5 65,1 22,4 62,3 35,8 1,9 0,7 58,2 41,1 71,0 18,8 5,8 4,4
1988 59,4 40,6 13,3 64,8 21,9 65,0 32,9 2,1 0,6 58,7 40,7 70,3 18,7 6,2 4,8
1989 59,8 40,2 12,1 64,8 23,1 66,4 31,5 2,1 0,4 59,4 40,2 69,2 19,2 6,3 5,4
1990 60,0 40,0 10,5 63,2 26,3 66,2 31,8 1,9 0,4 57,0 42,5 70,6 18,7 5,8 4,9
1991 61,5 38,5 11,0 60,9 26,0 65,0 31,1 1,8 0,5 53,4 44,1 70,4 16,2 5,6 5,6
1992 60,0 40,0 8,8 62,8 28,3 64,8 32,7 2,5 1,2 51,5 47,3 73,8 15,8 5,2 5,3
1993 59,6 40,4 7,9 61,7 30,5 63,0 33,9 3,1 0,3 51,2 48,5 78,1 12,3 3,8 5,8
1994 63,2 36,8 6,7 58,4 34,8 64,8 32,0 3,2 0,4 59,4 40,2 73,4 14,9 4,4 7,3
1995 65,4 34,6 6,5 56,5 37,0* 64,4 32,2 3,4 0,3 62,8 36,9 71,7 14,8 5,5 8,0
1996 63,8 36,2 4,5 52,1 43,4* 61,0 34,6 4,3 0,2 59,9 39,9 74,5 14,5 4,3 6,6
(*) 25 and over.
Source: Ministero del lavoro - Osservatorio sul mercato del Lavoro.101
TAB. 26 - TRAINING COURSES BY REGION
1990-91 (a) 1991-92 (b) 1992-93 (b)
N. % N. % N. %
Students
Centre 35.609 13,4 40.397 13,2 43.181 13,3
South 39.580 14,9 54.264 17,8 57.530 17,8
North 190.860 71,7 210.818 69,0 222.916 68,9
Total 266.049 100,0 305.479 100,0 323.637 100,0
Courses
Centre 2.398 18,9 3.288 22,0 3.430 22,0
South 1.766 13,9 2.190 14,6 2.049 13,1
North 8.526 67,2 9.489 63,4 10.123 64,9
Total 12.690 100,0 14.967 100,0 15.602 100,0
(a) excluding the provinces of Padua, Siena, Rieti, Latina, Frosinone, Isernia, Campobasso, Caserta, Be-
nevento, Avellino.
(b) excluding the region Apulia.
Source: Censis, based on data from ISTAT, Yearly Report 1995.
TAB. 27 - SOCIAL EUROPEAN FUND: OBJECTIVE 1 FINANCIAL ASSETS
(AT 31 DEC. 1995) Million Lira
Assets
Regions
Programmed Committed % Distributed %
Abruzzo 75823 95 73,3
Molise 40679 81,9 10,9
Campania 275193 19,4 0
Puglia 244178 49,8 35,4
Basilicata 152781 111,6 33,7
Calabria 159566 0 0
Sicilia 362209 121,3 2,1
Sardegna 168766 160,7 33,1
Total 1479195 78,5 17,7102
TAB. 28 - HIRING FOR SOCIALLY USEFUL PROJECTS, 31 DECEMBER 1996
Projects Workers
Nombers % Nombers %
Workers
per project
V. D'AOSTA 51 0,6 152 0,2 3,0
PIEMONTE 426 4,7 4.078 4,6 9,6
LOMBARDIA 365 4,0 1.163 1,3 3,2
LIGURIA 313 3,4 2.178 2,5 7,0
TRENTINO A. A. - - - - 0,0
VENETO 1.236 13,6 3.353 3,8 2,7
FRIULI V. G. 91 1,0 197 0,2 2,2
EMILIA ROMAGNA 171 1,9 434 0,5 2,5
TOSCANA 472 5,2 1.982 2,3 4,2
UMBRIA 184 2,0 1.202 1,4 6,5
MARCHE 403 4,4 3.056 3,5 7,6
LAZIO 1.292 14,2 12.352 14,0 9,6
ABRUZZO 440 4,8 3.688 4,2 8,4
MOLISE 311 3,4 946 1,1 3,0
CAMPANIA 1.645 18,1 28.508 32,4 17,3
PUGLIA 960 10,5 14.659 16,7 15,3
BASILICATA 274 3,0 2.597 3,0 9,5
CALABRIA 479 5,3 7.375 8,4 15,4
SICILIA - - - - 0,0
SARDEGNA - - - - 0,0
ITALY 9.113 100,0 87.920 100,0 9,6
SOUTH 4.109 45,1 57.773 65,7 14,1
CENTRE-NORTH 5.004 54,9 30.147 34,3 6,0
Source: Ministero del LavoroTAB. 29 - HIRINGS FOR SOCIALLY USEFUL PROJECTS, 30 June 1996
By age






workers < 40 40 - 50 > 50
V. D'AOSTA 77 42,9 57,1 91,7 8,3 0,0 18,2 51,9 29,9
PIEMONTE 1068 22,8 77,2 90,4 9,5 0,0 29,4 39,0 31,6
LOMBARDIA 390 41,3 58,7 93,3 6,7 0,0 56,9 24,1 19,0
LIGURIA 484 74,0 26,0 77,0 23,0 0,0 30,8 41,1 28,1
TRENTINO A.A.  - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
VENETO 284 58,8 41,2 62,7 37,3 0,0 20,4 28,9 50,7
FRIULI V.G. 421 61,5 38,5 87,5 12,5 0,0 33,5 25,9 40,6
EMILIA ROMAGNA 791 35,0 65,0 89,8 10,2 0,0 25,8 34,8 39,4
TOSCANA 1291 50,6 49,4 92,9 7,1 0,0 27,3 27,7 45,1
UMBRIA 1770 44,9 55,1 90,1 9,9 0,0 19,7 36,8 43,6
MARCHE 1483 n.a. n.a. 97,2 2,8 0,0 30,8 41,1 28,1
LAZIO 4484 50,3 49,7 90,6 9,4 0,0 27,9 49,2 23,0
ABRUZZO 2212 46,8 53,2 95,1 4,9 0,0 33,7 35,9 30,3
MOLISE 988 62,0 38,0 95,8 4,2 0,0 47,2 25,8 27,0
CAMPANIA 25746 72,8 27,2 97,2 2,8 0,0 42,7 37,9 19,5
PUGLIA 23001 63,0 37,0 96,3 3,2 0,5 17,1 40,5 42,5
BASILICATA 1361 63,9 36,1 95,3 4,7 0,0 43,0 36,8 20,1
CALABRIA 4834 86,1 13,9 89,6 10,4 0,0 31,8 67,5 0,6
SICILIA 1677 89,2 10,8 43,5 56,5 0,0 32,9 41,6 25,5
SARDEGNA 3827 84,3 15,7 90,0 4,0 5,9 30,5 44,8 24,7
ITALY 76189 65,4 32,6 73,9 25,8 0,3 30,8 41,1 28,1
SOUTH 63646 70,1 29,9 72,4 27,3 0,3 31,1 41,8 27,0
CENTRE-NORTH 12543 41,5 46,7 90,2 9,8 0,0 28,0 35,2 36,8
Source: Ministero del Lavoro.104













art. 1, c. 10
dl 510/96
(**)
V. D'AOSTA 23 21 0 30 3
PIEDMONT 118 852 98 0 0
LOMBARDY 202 103 71 11 3
LIGURIA 147 114 93 130 0
TRENTINOA.A. - - - - -
VENETO 23 33 198 12 18
FRIULIV.G. 216 10 186 9 0
EMILIAROMAGNA 164 127 462 12 26
TUSCANY 313 136 842 0 0
UMBRIA 204 1.437 127 2 0
MARCHE 73 689 721 0 0
LATIUM 776 2.478 798 80 352
ABRUZZO 489 767 889 8 59
MOLISE 100 308 512 31 37
CAMPANIA 835 23.432 1.355 0 124
APULIA 109 22.180 625 8 79
BASILICATA 389 587 299 0 86
CALABRIA 327 1.555 1.328 439 1185
SICILY 381 721 301 68 206
SARDINIA 0 3.827 0 0 0
ITALY 4.889 59.377 8.905 840 2.178
(*) WSS = wage supplementation scheme.
(**) workers stopped from WSS and mobility during Socially Useful Activities.
Source: Ministero del Lavoro.105
One of the most recent developments in supply labour policies
is “active labour policies” addressed towards disadvantaged job
seekers. The most important programmes are: Socially Useful Ac-
tivities, the Work Access and Training Programme for the Young
and the Special Programme for Young People Living in the South.
Data refer only to the older programme - Socially Useful Activi-
ties - and show a more complicated picture. Tab. 28 shows the
situation until 31 December 1996; 9113 projects involved 88,000
people in SUA, 66% of which were in the South - mainly Campania
32,4%, and Apulia 16,7% - where the workers are hired on aver-
age on larger projects -14,1 workers per project in the South and
6% of workers per project in other Italian regions. More detailed
information is available up to 30 June 1996 (see Tab. 29). 67% of
hired workers for SUA are male. If we consider hiring by age we
can see that this program concerns young people only partially -
just 31% of hired workers are under 40 years - but above all it is
addressed to job seekers with particular re-employment difficul-
ties. In fact Tab. 30 shows that the majority of workers imple-
mented on SUA are workers receiving social contributions or on
mobility roll and therefore job-seekers with a previous occupation.
The last two policies, - the Work Access and Training Pro-
gramme for the Young and the Special Programme for Youth Liv-
ing in the South -, are more recent and, also in this case, they
conform to the European labour policies guidelines in guarantee-
ing on first-time job seekers and/or the long-term unemployed, a
new start or a fresh start, in the form of training, retraining, work
experience or jobs.106
CONCLUSIONS
In the first section it was pointed out that Italian unemployment
derives from several causes. Structural features, such as its being
predominantly young and female and living in southern regions,
depend mainly on the economic development characterised by an
industrial growth favouring large northern firms and male workers
aged 30-45. On the other hand, industrial reorganisation in the
eighties and nineties, despite introducing more flexible processes
of production and increasing the service sector, to date, still does
not appear sustain either the feminisation phenomenon of the la-
bour market or increase the job opportunities for young people.
This phase of “growth without employment” has on the contrary
introduced new forms of unemployment since production reorgani-
sation has also put more guaranteed workers out the labour mar-
ket, with no chance of re-employment. Consequently, the eco-
nomic crisis in 1993-94 had significantly more dramatic conse-
quences in terms of job losses and the increase in long-term un-
employment.
The second section dealt with the present government’s labour
policy strategy to curb increasing unemployment. General goals
have been identified and discussed, namely (i) a reorganisation of
Public Administration towards a more decision making decentrali-
sation, (ii) an increasing solidarity between generations (pension
reform, more guarantees for young people - minimum wage, ac-
tive labour policies vs unemployment benefits guaranteeing only
older workers), and for women (reform of the anti-discrimination
and equal-opportunity law), (iii) an investment plan in infrastructure107
and human capital.
In this section, there was a more specific analysis of how single
labour policy programmes have been implemented. It has been
pointed out that in Italy these programmes claim to reach contem-
porary manifold objectives by single instruments. However, paying
special attention to the young people living in southern regions as
well as to first-time job seekers, women, the long-term unem-
ployed and the disabled, it becomes evident that jobless people
include numerous distinct unemployed categories each one with
specific job-search problems.
In fact, not all young first-time job seekers are long-term unem-
ployed, many of them are actually fired older workers not yet re-
employable. The young jobless living in the South are different in
comparison with those living in the North. The work access of
women is also different to that of men, because of discrimination
or of family responsibilities. Jobs, training or re-training opportuni-
ties laid out by the policies ought therefore to cover several issues
and to have different objectives accordingly.
The heterogeneity of jobless people might explain the failure of
such policies. We will examine two examples of youth labour poli-
cies.
The Youth Training Contracts have not been implemented to a
great extent in the South regions in particular and therefore they
have not affected youth employment in these regions (Graph. 24).
One explanation is that other incentives, mainly social security tax
relief, usually reduce the incentive to use YTCs in the South.
However, the main reason is the different form of youth work ac-
cess in the two areas. YTCs are a flexible tool used by firms to or-
ganise their labour force and obviously they are developed in re-
gions (North-Centre) where there is more industry. Therefore
YTCs have not been functional to all young unemployed people
but only to the unemployed living in the North or Centre.
A similar problem concerns Socially Useful Activities. They are
addressed to young people, the long-term unemployed, workers
on mobility roll, etc. and this gives rise to mistakes in evaluating
and implementing the projects. In fact, SUA projects for young
first-job seekers might contain features of active labour policy or of
new jobs, but if they are projects for the unemployed with a previ-108
ous occupation they might contain characteristics of retraining or
fresh jobs, what is more if they are addressed to workers in early
retirement they might contain income support elements until pen-
sion eligibility.
Finally it is stressed that changing policy design only, as far as
to give firms more incentives to arise employment or job search
opportunities for unemployed people, is not enough to solve the
unemployment problem. There is an urgent need for more ade-
quate monitoring of the programmes and a cost-benefit analysis in
order to evaluate them effectively. Furthermore the political proc-
ess which underlies policy design must not be ignored. These in-
efficiencies in Italian labour policy strategy, if left unresolved, may
seriously hinder the process of reducing unemployment.
In conclusion although one of the most explicit objectives of
Italian labour policy today is to solve the youth unemployment
problem, this still calls for a selection and a implementation of
suitable and efficient programmes.109
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